Le 18-juil.-06, à 17:02, 1Z a écrit :
> It is far from obvious that a simulation even
> contains 1stP POV's.
I agree with you. That is why I postulate comp to begin with.
> In any case
> that doesn't effect the logic: simulations
> *might* be detectable, so they are not necessarily
I totally agree with you. Indeed, I take the qm-MWI (Everett, Deutsch,
...) as evidence we are detecting the "simulated" or "emulated" aspect
of our reality.
Comp predict that any machine looking below its "level of substitution"
will detect, albeit indirectly, the presence of *many* interfering
realities. Only with comp, those realities are not material, but number
>> No. But what actually *seems* to exist, could emerge from mathematical
> No, same problem. There's no more any phenomenality to be
> found in maths than any substantiallity.
But there is no more any phenomenality to be found in physics, nor
really substantiality, unless you define it by electron or strings. But
nobody has proved that electron or string, or energy, ... are stuffy.
In books and laboratories I see only relation between numbers, and
eventually they are related to personal qualia, like the feeling to see
a needle on some apparatus.
You seem to believe it is easier to make consciousness emerged or just
related with stuffy things. How and why? Many philosophers of mind
agree that a pain or any qualia are not something localized. A pain is
already immaterial, and that is why so many accept the comp hyp
(perhaps without seeing the consequences of it): it is easier to
explain (or to tackle an explanation) of consciousness (immaterial)
from something immaterial (like numbers or relations between numbers)
than on something material. Especially when we don't know what
"material" really means. I hope you agree that the mind/body problem is
not yet solved. My point is just a reformulation of it in the comp
frame. Then I got partial solutions.
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