>From: Bruno Marchal
>All we need to *reason* for getting consequence of comp is that such 
>substitution is *in principle* possible. Theoreticians does that, in many > 
>fields. I insist that the UDA (Universal Dovetailer Argument) is based on 
>the notion of generalized brain: you could say that your brain in the 
>entire galaxy. By comp this entails the entire galaxy is turing emulable, 
>then, this is enough to say the platonic UD will go through your 
>"generalized" brain soon or later (in term of number of steps), and that is 
>enough to understand that comp makes obligatory that the laws of physics 
>emerge from the relation existing among numbers (that + other steps of the 
>reasoning of course). The impracticality of substitution is just not 
>relevant to throw out the theoretical consequences. Then comp can be tested 
>experimentally due to others consequences (like the observable interference 
>among many computations, etc.). OK?

I have an idea (or dream) for some time. Let's call it the "perfect universe 
argument" (PUA).
The purpose of PUA is to produce a perfect universe (a perfect world without 
any crimes, any bad things, any natural disasters ... etc.).
It's as follows:
(1) I teleport myself to the origin of the universe.
(2) I adjust some parameters of the universe. (This is like adjusting some 
parameters in a modern PC program
so that you can get the perfect result when running the program.)
(3) The adjustment changes the whole universe immediately and the universe 
becomes perfect.
PUA is possible in principle, right? Does it agree to Comp. and UDA?

>From: Stathis Papaioannou
>Do you believe that IF you vanished at point A and a copy of you created at 
>point B who was physically and mentally similar to the original to the same 
>extent as if you had walked from A to B you would have survived? If you 
>answer "no" then you are opening yourself up to the possibility that would 
>not survive the walk either. If you argue that the copy might be 
>physiacally the same but mentally different then you are saying there is 
>some non-physical basis to identity which survives walking but not 
>teleportation, which I suppose is possible, but there is no reason to 
>believe that such a strange thing would or could have evolved.

I can't compare teleportation of human beings with walking since 
teleportation is still a fiction now.
It's also unknown if there is something non-physical in human (or living) 



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