Le 08-août-06, à 05:34, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal writes (quoting SP):
>>> ...a controlled
>>> experiment in which measure can be turned up and down leaving
>>> everything else
>>> the same, such as having an AI running on several computers in
>> I think that the idea that a lower measure OM will appear more complex
>> is a consequence of Komogorov like ASSA theories (a-la Hal Finney,
>> Mallah, etc.). OK?
> I understand the basic principle, but I have trouble getting my mind
> the idea of defining a measure when every possible computation exists.
I am not sure I understand. All real number exist, for example, and it
is the reason why we can put a measure on it. All computations exist
(this is equivalent with arithmetical realism) yet some are or at least
could be relatively more frequent than others.
>> I agree from some 1 pov. But 1 plural pov here would lead to some
>> inequalities violation". That is: sharable experiments which shows
>> indirectly the presence of some alternate computations.
> I don't understand this statement. I am suggesting that the computers
> running exactly the same program - same circuitry, same software, same
> initial conditions, all on a classical scale. I don't see that there
> is any way
> for the AI to know which computer he was running on (if that question
> even meaningful) or how many computers were running.
I know it looks counterintuitive, but an AI can know which computer is
running and how many they are. It is a consequence of comp, and the UDA
shows why. The answer is:
the computer which is running are the relative universal number which
exist in arithmetical platonia (arithmetical truth is already a
universal video game, if you want, and it is the simplest). How many
are they? 2^aleph_zero.
I have already explain it here:
It is a key point and we can come back on it if you have some
>>> If I
>>> were the AI the only advantage I can think of in having multiple
>>> computers running
>>> is for backup in case some of them broke down; beyond that, I
>>> care if there
>>> were one copy or a million copies of me running in parallel.
>> Except, as I said above, for the relative probabilities. But this is
>> equivalent with accepting a well done back-up will not change your
>> "normal" measure.
> Yes, I think what you mean by "relative probabilities" is that if
> there were
> several possible versions of "me next moment", then I would be more
> to experience the one with higher measure. It is only relative to the
> possibilities that measure makes a subjective difference.
Ah but you get the point now!
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