Bruno Marchal wrote:
> Le 23-août-06, à 14:39, Russell Standish a écrit : > > > > > On Wed, Aug 23, 2006 at 04:15:41PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > >> > >>> Physical supervenience is not equivalent to assuming a concrete > >>> primitive material world. The latter is an additional assumption. > >> > >> > >> This depends entirely of what you mean by physical. If > >> "physical-supervenience" alludes to the comp-physics, then ok. If this > >> alludes to physics as understood by a aristotelian-matter physicist, > >> then physical supervenience need it. > >> Maudlin talk only about supervenience. For him it is just obvious that > >> comp makes it physical. Of course he is wrong there (or UDA contains > >> an > >> error, but this remains to be shown). > >> I have coined the term "physical supervenience", with "physical" > >> having > >> its standard aristotelian sense just to distinguish it with the > >> comp-supervenience idea that mind relies on the immaterial > >> computations > >> (an infinity of them to be precise). > >> > >> > >> Bruno > >> > >> > >> > >> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > >> > > > > > > Then this probably explains the confusion. Supervenience is merely > > the statement that the physical tokens of a consciousness cannot be > > identical for two different consciousnesses. The is independent of > > whether those "physical tokens" are "stuffy" or not - remember I have > > already bought your reversal of physical and mental explanations. > > > Thanks for acknowledging. > > > > > > Since you have already used "physical" to refer to this appearance of > > an objective universe, I merely thought you meant this classical > > supervenience when contraposed against computational supervenience. > > > I should perhaps use more systematically the expression "comp-physical". > > > > > > My point is that this classical supervenience is another way of > > stating the anthropic principle, and it is essential to avoid the > > whole idealist programme spiralling down the plughole of solipsism. > > > > So what your really saying when you've shown COMP => - PHYS SUP is > > that stuffy materialism is contradicted?? > > > Not really contradicted. Only that stuffy materialism cannot attach the > first person to material stuff. Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate. If it were impossible to attach a class of properties to a substrate, that would constitute a property of the substrate, and so it would not be bare > The notion of stuff loose its ability > to explain the behavior of matter (which emerges from a measure on an > infinity of computations). It does not loose its ability to explain > mind because, well, it has never succeed on that question to begin > with. Bare substrate is compatible with qualia. Nothing-but-numbers is not. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---