Le 25-août-06, à 02:31, 1Z a écrit :

> Of course it can. Anything can be attached to a bare substrate.

It follows from the UDA that you cannot do that, unless you put 
explicitly actual infinite in the "bare substrate", an then attach your 
mind to it (how?).



>  If it
> were impossible to attach a class of properties to a substrate,
> that would constitute a property of the substrate, and so it would not
> be bare

I am sorry but you lost me here. Especially when elsewhere you say the 
bare substrate can have subjective experiences.



> Bare substrate is compatible with qualia.

How?


> Nothing-but-numbers is not.

Why?


> If Platonia is not real in any sense, it cannot
> contain observers, persons, appearances, etc.
>
>>> To exist Platonically is to exist eternally and necessarily. There is
>>> no time or changein Plato's heave.
>>
>>
>> All partial recursive solutions of Schroedinger or Dirac equation
>> exists in Platonia, and define through that "block description" notion
>> of internal time quite analogous to Everett subjective probabilities.
>
> The A-series cannot be reduced to the B-series.


All the point is that with Church thesis you can do that.

>
>>> A program is basically the same as a number.
>>
>> No it isn't. You don't know which programme is specified
>> by a number without knowing how the number is to
>> be interpreted, ie what hardware it is running on.


Not necessarily. The numbers can be interpreted by other numbers. The 
closure of the Fi for diagonalization makes this possible. No need for 
more than numbers and their additive and multiplicative behavior. I 
don't pretend this is obvious.

>
>>
>>> A process or a computation
>>> is a finite or infinite sequence of numbers (possibly branching, and
>>> defined relatively to a universal numbers).
>>
>> It is not just a sequence, because a sequence
>> does not specify counterfactuals.

That is why I said "possibly branching".


>
>> The UD build all such (branching) sequences.
>
> If it exists.


>>
>> That way, except I say this from the comp assumption, unlike Deutsch
>> who says this from the quantum assumption. (of course "real" means 
>> here
>> generated by the UD)
>
> If it exists.


Even Robinson Arithmetic "believes" in the UD.  The UD exists like the 
square root of two, or any recursively enumerable set.
You exist in a sense related to that existence but not necessarily 
identical. It depends also if by "I" you mean such or such n-person 
view of "I". But I give all the precise definitions elsewhere.


> Because in a mathematics-only universe, qualia have to be identified
> with, or reduced to, mathematical structures.


Certainly. They are given by the intensional variant of G* \minus G. 
See my SANE paper.


>
> If your Platonia is restricted to arithmetic, that would be
> a contingent fact.


I just need people believe that what they learn at school in math 
remains true even if they forget it.
I use the poetical term "platonia" mainly when I use freely the 
excluded middle, and put no bound on the length of the computations. In 
the lobian interview, "the belief in platonia" is defined by (A v ~A).  
You can take it formally or just accept that closed first order 
sentences build with the symbols {S, +, *, 0} are either true or false. 
You need this just for using the term "conjecture" in number theory.

Don't put more in "platonia" than we need it in the reasoning and in 
the working with the theory. When I say that a number exists, I say it 
in the usual sense of the mathematicians. My ontology is what Brouwer 
called the separable part of mathematics: it is the domain where all 
mathematicians agree, except the ultra-intuitionist (a microscopic 
non-comp minority).

Bruno



http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/


--~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 
http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list
-~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---

Reply via email to