On Fri, Aug 25, 2006 at 04:48:01PM +0200, Bruno Marchal wrote:
> 
> > The UD is
> > quite possibly enough to emulate the full Multiverse (this is sort of 
> > where
> > Bruno's partail results are pointing), which we know contain conscious
> > processes.
> 
> Of course a non-computationalist will say that it contains only 
> "zombie".

A non-computationalist will believe that the Multiverse contains
conscious processes (if they believe in a Multiverse at all). However,
they may disagree that the Multiverse is Turing emulable.

Personally, I am open to the statement that the Multiverse is Turing
emulable, even if each history within the MV is definitely not. Does
the former statement make me a "computationalist"?


> Now I have a problem with the assertion "the UD emulates the full 
> Multiverse".
> This is because, a priori, with comp, by the UDA, the comp-physical 
> laws will emerge from the first person (plural) computations and their 

The comp-physical laws (indeed the physical ones) are 1st person
plural things, and in themselves not Turing emulable. But the ensemble
as described by Schroedingers equation is deterministic and
reversible. Why shouldn't this be Turing emulable in your scheme?

> >
> > So am I computationalist? On the most obvious level, no. However,
> > considering the above perhaps I am Bruno's sort of computationalist
> > with a very deep level of replacement (ie switching entire realities).
> 
> 
> OK, that looks like what I was saying.
> 
> 
> >
> > Confused? That would make two of us.
> 
> 
> Ah? Why? You seemed quite coherent here ...
> 

Confused because I don't think that switching entire realities counts
as surviving the "Yes Doctor" experiment.

I do actually subscribe to the view that it is possible to replace my
brain with appropriately configured silicon & wires, but because of
the Maudlin/movie-graph argument, such an artifical brain must be sensitive to
quantum randomness. This is a non-computationalist "Yes, Doctor"
proposition.

On a slightly incidental note, I was wondering your thoughts of a
possible paradox in your argument. Since COMP predicts
COMP-immortality, the doctor may as well make a recording of your
brain and put it in the filing cabinet to gather dust, as you will
survive in Plato's heaven anyway. Furthermore, you could just say "No
doctor", and still survive through COMP-immortality.

It would seem that "Pascal's wager" should have you saying "No doctor"
(if the point was to survive terminal illness, anyway).

Cheers

-- 
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