Russell Standish writes:

> On Sat, Aug 26, 2006 at 10:01:36PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> > Are you suggesting that of two very similar programs, one containing a true 
> > random 
> > number generator and the other a pseudorandom number generator, only the 
> > former 
> > could possibly be conscious? I suppose it is possible, but I see no reason 
> > to believe 
> > that it is true.
> > 
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> 
> I think this is what Maudlin's argument tells us. Is it that so
> preposterous to you? 

It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious is 
assumed to be 
preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could have acted differently 
even with 
identical environmental inputs, which is what the feeling of "free will" is. 
However, it is 
possible that I might *not* have been able to act differently: simply feeling 
that I could 
have done so is not evidence that it is the case. And even if it were the case, 
due to true 
quantum randomness or the proliferation of branches in the multiverse leading 
to the effect 
of first person indeterminacy, it does not follow that this is necessary for 
consciousness to 
occur. 
 
> I thought I had another argument based on creativity, but it seems
> pseduo RNG programs can be creative, provided the RNG is cryptic enough.

Right, it's the complexity of the program that generates interesting and 
perhaps intelligent 
behaviour, not its randomness. 

Stathis Papaioannou
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