Le 25-août-06, à 10:09, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> You would if it were the non-miraculous branches that were selectively
> pruned, although I guess that it is just this sort of pruning people 
> would
> be asking of God (you would hardly need to pray that your coffee remain
> coffee). Nevertheless, even if the content of your conscious experience
> changed, there is no reason why you should not remain conscious as long
> as there was one single branch left in which you were conscious. To 
> put it
> differently, there is no way you can tell that some single world / 
> collapsing
> wave function interpretation of QM is correct, if you exclude quantum
> interference effects (and even that does not convince everyone, as we
> know).

OK. Of course we cannot prune the UD*, nor can we make 317 disappearing.

> What I meant was, if a computer program can be associated with
> consciousness, then a rigid and deterministic computer program can also
> be associated with consciousness - leaving aside the question of how
> exactly the association occurs.

I agree with this. (I guess you mean that consciousness is assciated 
with the computation).
After UDA we know also that consciousness is attributed with all the 
similar computation, and not with any particular instantiation. A brain 
does not generate consciousness by its working. It is less incorrect to 
say a brain emerges (not in time, but in an arithmetical way) by making 
conscious experiences stable relatively to high measure potential, and 
this makes us capable of interacting stably with respect to our normal 
(gaussian) histories.

> For example, suppose I have a conversation
> with a putatively conscious computer program as part of a Turing test, 
> and
> the program passes, convincing me and everyone else that it has been
> conscious during the test. Then, I start up the program again with no 
> memory
> saved from the first run, but this time I play it a recording of my 
> voice from
> the first test. The program will go through exactly the same resposes 
> as
> during the first run, but this time to an external observer who saw 
> the first
> run the program's responses will be no more surprising that my 
> questions
> on the recording of my voice. The program itself won't know what's 
> coming
> and it might even think it is being clever by throwing is some 
> "unpredictable"
> answers to prove how free and human-like it really is. I don't think 
> there is any
> basis for saying it is conscious during the first run but not during 
> the second.

I agree with you. All those problems disappear if you attach the 
consciousness to the abstract type of the computation. This works 
because that type comes together with the relative possible weighs.



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