Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Peter Jones writes (quoting Russell Standish and SP): > > > > > It is true that Maudlin's argument depends on the absurdity of a > > > > recording being conscious. If you can accept a recording as being > > > > conscious, then you would have trouble in accepting the conclusion > > > > that counterfactuals are relevant. > > > > > > That's what I'm disputing. You can have machines handling > > > counterfactuals, like a thermostat, > > > that aren't conscious (not much, anyway), and machines not handling > > > counterfactuals, like a > > > complex computer or human with rigidly constrained inputs, that is > > > conscious. > > > > Computer always have counterfactuals, because there changing > > one part of them (whether data or programme) has an effect on > > the overall behaviour. Changing one part of a recording (e.g splicing > > a film) changes only *that* part. > > I don't think you can distinguish between recording and computation on that > basis. By "recording" > I don't mean just the film, but the film + projector as system. The film is > the computer's fixed input > and the computer is the projector in this case. A closer analogy would be a > software media player > playing an .mpg file: the output is rigidly fixed by the input, although the > media player handles > counterfactuals in that the output would be different if the input were > different. But the same is > true of any physical system sensitive to initial conditions.
I don't see how that helps you argument. Such a "recording" is not just a string of unrelated states. There is something beyond the manifest, active state that explains how one state makes the transition to another. (Of couse I would say that "something" is matter/physical laws). > > > The latter seems > > > obvious to me from the fact that an entity experiences only one stream of > > > consciousness at a > > > time, regardless of how many actual (in the multiverse) or possible (in a > > > single universe model, > > > with or without true randomness) braches there are in which that entity > > > is conscious. > > > > That doesn't follow. A counterfactual is a COUNTERfactual - -it is > > something that could have happenned but didn't. There is no > > reason why we should be conscious of in things > > we coudl have done but didn't. (Unless counterfactuals > > are itnerpreted as alternate worlds, but then they > > are not really COUNTERfactuals -- they actually > > did happen, buit "somewhere else"). > > That's just the point I am making: there is no reason why we should be > conscious of things we > could have done but didn't, Well, there is if you start from the premisses that 1) consciousness is a type of computation 2) computations provide counterfactuals 3) In an immaterial universe, counterfactuals are provided by "other worlds". > and there is no reason I should notice anything strange had happened > if all my copies in other multiverse branches suddenly drop dead. Even if as > a matter of fact it can be > shown that consciousness is always associated with the actual or potential > implementation of > counterfactuals, it does not follow that we are conscious *as a result* of > this. The claim of computationalism is that we are indeed conscious as the result of running a program. If you are going to reject compuationalism, what other route do you have to a immaterial, Everythingist universe ? > > The claim that consciousness requires counterfactuals > > stems from the argument that consciousness is > > comptutation, and computation requires counterfactuals. > > > > It doesn't stem from an expeiential insight into counterfactual > > situations. > > A practical computer requires counterfactuals in order to interact with its > environment. A computer programme has counterfactuals because in general it has if-then branches, and in gnereal it doesn't execute them all. That is a quite separate consideration from "interacting with the environment". > The > problem with this idea is that firstly *any* physical system interacting with > its environment > handles counterfactuals, Why is that a problem ? The claim is that programmes have counterfactuals, not that everything with a counterfactuals is a programme. > and secondly there is no reason to assume that the handling of > counterfactuals is somehow responsible for consciousness. The purported reason is computationalism. You culd abandon it, but where does that leave you ? > A rigidly determined computation > may be a "trivial" case of a computation but it does not mean it is not a > computation A determined system can still have counterfactuals. > . A machine > hardwired to compute the digits of pi, and nothing else, is still computing > the digits of pi even though > it isn't much use as a general purpose computer. And it would computer something else if it were hardwired differently. It still fulfils the "internal counterfactual criterion" -- if one of its states were changed, the subsequent sequence of states would change. Unlike movie. >Similarly, we can imagine beings who are still > conscious even though their lives are rigidly determined. Counterfactuals are *not* the same thing as indeterminism. > You have to come up with a good reason > as to why constraining the possible paths a stream of consciousness can take > will cause loss of > consciousness. The purported reason is computationalism. You could abandon it, but where does that leave you ? > Stathis Papaioannou > _________________________________________________________________ > Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. > http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
