Peter Jones writes: 

[quoting Quentin Anciaux]
> > I didn't claim that, I simply asked more explanation on the following answer
> > you give to Stathis:
> >
> > Stathis: "For example, the version of me alive
> > in the multiverse branches where he has won the lottery every week for a 
> > year
> > has much lower measure, but he is not proportionately less conscious."
> >
> > Peter: "Then you have a WR problem. Barbour introduces the idea
> > that low-measure Nows are less conscious in order to
> > avoid the WR problem, and with no other motivation."
> >
> > As I understand your answer you seem to imply that you agree that the 
> > Stathis
> > version who has won the lottery every week for a year has much lower measure
> > and by quoting Barbour ideas of low measure "now"/OM are less conscious  to
> > avoid white rabbit problem
> No I don't.
> I think Stathis's theory is wrong because his
> winning the lottery would subjectively be 50:50.

Where does that come from? If my chance of winning the lottery in any one week 
1/million (roughly correct for the first prize in many state lotteries) then my 
of winning it every week for a year is 1/million^52, a very small probability 
indeed. In 
the MWI I am this lucky in 1/million^52 branches, which gives the same 
expectation of 
winning as in a single world scenario. But my original point was that this very 
version of me would be just as conscious as the more numerous or more likely 
versions: actual or potential counterfactual branches have no effect on the 
experience* of consciousness, even if by probability theory they have an effect 
the content of our conscious experience.

Stathis Papaioannou
Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to