Peter Jones writes: [quoting Quentin Anciaux] > > I didn't claim that, I simply asked more explanation on the following answer > > you give to Stathis: > > > > Stathis: "For example, the version of me alive > > in the multiverse branches where he has won the lottery every week for a > > year > > has much lower measure, but he is not proportionately less conscious." > > > > Peter: "Then you have a WR problem. Barbour introduces the idea > > that low-measure Nows are less conscious in order to > > avoid the WR problem, and with no other motivation." > > > > As I understand your answer you seem to imply that you agree that the > > Stathis > > version who has won the lottery every week for a year has much lower measure > > and by quoting Barbour ideas of low measure "now"/OM are less conscious to > > avoid white rabbit problem > > No I don't. > > I think Stathis's theory is wrong because his > winning the lottery would subjectively be 50:50.
Where does that come from? If my chance of winning the lottery in any one week is 1/million (roughly correct for the first prize in many state lotteries) then my chance of winning it every week for a year is 1/million^52, a very small probability indeed. In the MWI I am this lucky in 1/million^52 branches, which gives the same expectation of winning as in a single world scenario. But my original point was that this very lucky version of me would be just as conscious as the more numerous or more likely poorer versions: actual or potential counterfactual branches have no effect on the *actual experience* of consciousness, even if by probability theory they have an effect on the content of our conscious experience. Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to email@example.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---