Brent Meeker wrote:
> 1Z wrote:
> > Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >> Russell Standish writes:
> >>> On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> >>>> It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious
> >>>> is
> >>>> assumed to be preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could
> >>>> have
> >>>> acted differently even with identical environmental inputs, which is what
> >>>> the feeling of "free will" is. However, it is possible that I might *not*
> >>>> have been able to act differently: simply feeling that I could have done
> >>>> so
> >>>> is not evidence that it is the case. And even if it were the case, due to
> >>>> true quantum randomness or the proliferation of branches in the
> >>>> multiverse
> >>>> leading to the effect of first person indeterminacy, it does not follow
> >>>> that
> >>>> this is necessary for consciousness to occur.
> >>> It is true that Maudlin's argument depends on the absurdity of a recording
> >>> being conscious. If you can accept a recording as being conscious, then
> >>> you
> >>> would have trouble in accepting the conclusion that counterfactuals are
> >>> relevant.
> >> That's what I'm disputing. You can have a machine handling
> >> counterfactuals, like
> >> a thermostat, that aren't conscious (not much, anyway), and machines not
> >> handling counterfactuals, like a complex computer or human with rigidly
> >> constrained inputs, that is conscious.
> > Computer always have counterfactuals, because there changing one part of
> > them
> > (whether data or programme) has an effect on the overall behaviour.
> > Changing one
> > part of a recording (e.g splicing a film) changes only *that* part.
> But a branch in a program need not change very much.
Chainging one bit of a programme can change everything.
> It seems that now you are
> introducing a new critereon, a degree of "counterfactualness" required for
Movies how no counterfactualness and are therefore not
(implementationsof ) programmes.
we can say that without knowing how much counterfactualness
*is* required for consciousness.
> Brent Meeker
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