Brent Meeker wrote: > 1Z wrote: > > > > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > > >> Russell Standish writes: > >> > >> > >>> On Sun, Aug 27, 2006 at 09:31:15PM +1000, Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > >>> > >>>> It seems to me that the idea of a deterministic machine being conscious > >>>> is > >>>> assumed to be preposterous, for no good reason. I believe that I could > >>>> have > >>>> acted differently even with identical environmental inputs, which is what > >>>> the feeling of "free will" is. However, it is possible that I might *not* > >>>> have been able to act differently: simply feeling that I could have done > >>>> so > >>>> is not evidence that it is the case. And even if it were the case, due to > >>>> true quantum randomness or the proliferation of branches in the > >>>> multiverse > >>>> leading to the effect of first person indeterminacy, it does not follow > >>>> that > >>>> this is necessary for consciousness to occur. > >>> > >>> It is true that Maudlin's argument depends on the absurdity of a recording > >>> being conscious. If you can accept a recording as being conscious, then > >>> you > >>> would have trouble in accepting the conclusion that counterfactuals are > >>> relevant. > >> > >> That's what I'm disputing. You can have a machine handling > >> counterfactuals, like > >> a thermostat, that aren't conscious (not much, anyway), and machines not > >> handling counterfactuals, like a complex computer or human with rigidly > >> constrained inputs, that is conscious. > > > > > > Computer always have counterfactuals, because there changing one part of > > them > > (whether data or programme) has an effect on the overall behaviour. > > Changing one > > part of a recording (e.g splicing a film) changes only *that* part. > > But a branch in a program need not change very much.
Chainging one bit of a programme can change everything. > It seems that now you are > introducing a new critereon, a degree of "counterfactualness" required for > consciousness. Movies how no counterfactualness and are therefore not (implementationsof ) programmes. we can say that without knowing how much counterfactualness *is* required for consciousness. > Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---