Le 03-sept.-06, à 05:07, Stathis Papaioannou a écrit :

> The dynamism part can be provided by a simple physical system such as 
> the idle passage of time.
> If you allow for parallel processing you don't need much time either. 
> This leads to a situation whereby
> every computation is implemented by universe with a single electron 
> enduring for a nanosecond, for
> example. I can't quite see how to get rid of the electron, but 
> Maudlin's and Bruno's conclusion from
> this seems to be that it is absurd and implies that the mental does 
> not actually supervene on the physical.

I think you mix the Mallah Putnam implementation problem, related to 
the idea that any piece of matter could compute, and Maudlin's thought 
experiment showing the incompatibility of the physical supervenience 
thesis (that consciousness should supervene on the physical activity of 
a computer running the computation) and computationalism (that 
consciousness is invariant for a digital functional substitution made 
at some level).

Maudlin build first a digital machine, let us call it M, which do a 
computation PI (Maudlin's name for it) which we suppose does correspond 
to a genuine consciousness experience (for example some remembering of 
the taste of cocoa).
Suppose that during the running of that particular computation PI, the 
register r1, ...r67 are never used. Maudlin argue that if consciousness 
is attached to the physical activity relevant for the computation, we 
can retrieve those unused part of the computer, without changing the 
consciousness experience.
He shows then that he can managed to build a version of M, 
proto-olympia (say) which has almost no physical activity at all when 
he follows the PI computation.
Proto-olympia  is *physically* accidentally correct for PI, but no more 
counterfactually correct.
Then Maudlin reintroduces the unused parts, the Klaras, which 
reintroduces the counterfactual correctness, WITHOUT ADDING any comp 
relevant physical activity (if not, it would mean the level is 
incorrect(*)). So comp + physical supervenience (phys-sup) would force 
us to associate any consciousness experience to any physical processes. 
And that would kill comp! So sup-phys -> NOT comp, or equivalently comp 
-> NOT sup-phys.
We still have notions of computational supervenience, where persons and 
consciousness are associated to relative number theoretical relations.


(*) This explains also why, AT THIS STAGE, to move on a physical 
multiverse would not help (Russell's Standish move), unless it makes US 
non computable, but that would be equivalent to abandoning both comp 
and the quantum (given that quantum mechanics is quantum turing 


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