David Nyman wrote:

> 1Z wrote: > > > Statements, concepts and beliefs must > > be contingently instantiated. That doesn't > > mean that their truths-values are logially > > contingent. > > > > I'm not sure that in a world of strictly contingent existence one can > establish a 'logical necessity' that is independent of 'contingent > instantiation' Why should the *truth* of a statement be dependent on the *existence* of an instance of it ? Moreover, the necessary truth of mathematical statements follows from their lack or real referents:- Mathematical statements are necessarily true because there are no possible circumstances that make them false; there are no possible circumstances that would make them false because they do not refer to anything external. This is much simpler than the Platonist alternative that mathematical statements: 1) have referents which are 2) unchanging and eternal, unlike anything anyone has actually seen and thereby 3) explain the necessity (invariance) of mathematical statements without 4) performing any other role -- they are not involved in mathematical proof. > and thus escapes restriction to 'necessary under certain > contingencies' (even if these are equivalent to 'any that I can > imagine'). If one is going to be a 'contingentist', then one might as > well be a thoroughgoing one. > > > But physical possibility is a subset > > of logical possibility, so the physical > > systems can't do anything its abstract counterpart > > cannot do, so what is true of the abstract system > > is true of any phsycial systems that really instantiates it. > > I agree. However what I'm saying is that in a world of contingent > existence *everything* is contingently instantiated. What does instantiation have to do with truth ? > Consequently, > neither 'physical possibility' nor 'logical possibility' can escape > dependency on such instantiation. Logical possibility is defined in terms of contradiciton. Why should it turn out to be nonetheless dependent on instantiation ? > In a world of contingent existence > the elevation of any 'necessary truth' above contingency is dubious and > possibly incoherent. I don't see why. You just seem to be treating truth and existence as interchangeable, which begs the questions AFAICS. > To be coherent AFAICS one would need to be making > ontic claims for 'necessary truth' that would constrain 'contingent > possibility'. I have no idea what you mean by that. Why would a claim about necessary truth be ontic rather than epistemic, for instance ? --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---