Russel Standish writes: > Or my point that in a Multiverse, counterfactuals are instantiated > anyway. Physical supervenience and computationalism are not > incompatible in a multiverse, where "physical" means the observed > properties of things like electrons and so on.
I'd think that in the context of a multiverse, physical supervenience would say that whether consciousness is instantiated would depend only on physical conditions here, at this point in the multiverse, and would not depend on conditions elsewhere. It would be a sort of "locality condition" for the multiverse. In that case it seems you still have a problem because even if counterfactuals are tested elsewhere in the multiverse, whether they are handled correctly will not be visible locally. So you'd still have a contradiction, with supervenience saying that consciousness depends only on local physical conditions, while computationalism would say that consciousness depends on the results of counterfactual tests done in other branches or worlds of the multiverse. Hal Finney --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
