Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a 
>>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of 
>>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any 
>>>computation as evidence that there is something special and 
>>>about the brain. Maybe they're right.
>>>Stathis Papaioannou
>>Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every possible 
>>(which seems absurd to me)?  Then allow that only computations with some 
>>structure are conscious.
> It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that only 
> computations 
> implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be conscious. You 
> need the 
> hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a God-given 
> programming 
> language against which candidate computations can be measured.

I regard that as a feature - not a bug. :-)

Disembodied computation doesn't quite seem absurd - but our empirical sample 
for embodiment.

Brent Meeker

You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at

Reply via email to