Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > Brent Meeker writes: > > >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a >>>conscious >>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of >>>computationalism >>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any >>>conscious >>>computation as evidence that there is something special and >>>non-computational >>>about the brain. Maybe they're right. >>> >>>Stathis Papaioannou >> >>Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every possible >>computation >>(which seems absurd to me)? Then allow that only computations with some >>special >>structure are conscious. > > > It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that only > computations > implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be conscious. You > need the > hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a God-given > programming > language against which candidate computations can be measured.
I regard that as a feature - not a bug. :-) Disembodied computation doesn't quite seem absurd - but our empirical sample argues for embodiment. Brent Meeker --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
