Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> Brent Meeker writes:
>>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a
>>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of
>>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any
>>>computation as evidence that there is something special and
>>>about the brain. Maybe they're right.
>>Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every possible
>>(which seems absurd to me)? Then allow that only computations with some
>>structure are conscious.
> It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that only
> implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be conscious. You
> need the
> hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a God-given
> language against which candidate computations can be measured.
I regard that as a feature - not a bug. :-)
Disembodied computation doesn't quite seem absurd - but our empirical sample
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