Peter Jones writes: > Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > > Brent meeker writes: > > > > > >>>I think it goes against standard computationalism if you say that a > > > >>>conscious > > > >>>computation has some inherent structural property. Opponents of > > > >>>computationalism > > > >>>have used the absurdity of the conclusion that anything implements any > > > >>>conscious > > > >>>computation as evidence that there is something special and > > > >>>non-computational > > > >>>about the brain. Maybe they're right. > > > >>> > > > >>>Stathis Papaioannou > > > >> > > > >>Why not reject the idea that any computation implements every possible > > > >>computation > > > >>(which seems absurd to me)? Then allow that only computations with > > > >>some special > > > >>structure are conscious. > > > > > > > > > > > > It's possible, but once you start in that direction you can say that > > > > only computations > > > > implemented on this machine rather than that machine can be conscious. > > > > You need the > > > > hardware in order to specify structure, unless you can think of a > > > > God-given programming > > > > language against which candidate computations can be measured. > > > > > > I regard that as a feature - not a bug. :-) > > > > > > Disembodied computation doesn't quite seem absurd - but our empirical > > > sample argues > > > for embodiment. > > > > > > Brent Meeker > > > > I don't have a clear idea in my mind of disembodied computation except in > > rather simple cases, > > like numbers and arithmetic. The number 5 exists as a Platonic ideal, and > > it can also be implemented > > so we can interact with it, as when there is a collection of 5 oranges, or > > 3 oranges and 2 apples, > > or 3 pairs of oranges and 2 triplets of apples, and so on, in infinite > > variety. The difficulty is that if we > > say that "3+2=5" as exemplified by 3 oranges and 2 apples is conscious, > > then should we also say > > that the pairs+triplets of fruit are also conscious? > > No, they are only subroutines.
But a computation is just a lot of subroutines; or equivalently, a computation is just a subroutine in a larger computation or subroutine. > > If so, where do we draw the line? > > At specific structures By "structures" do you mean hardware or software? I don't think it's possible to pin down software structures without reference to a particular machine and operating system. There is no natural or God-given language. > > That is what I mean > > when I say that any computation can map onto any physical system. The > > physical structure and activity > > of computer A implementing program a may be completely different to that of > > computer B implementing > > program b, but program b may be an emulation of program a, which should > > make the two machines > > functionally equivalent and, under computationalism, equivalently conscious. > > So ? If the functional equivalence doesn't depend on a > baroque-reinterpretation, > where is the problem ? Who interprets the meaning of "baroque"? > > Maybe this is wrong, eg. > > there is something special about the insulation in the wires of machine A, > > so that only A can be conscious. > > But that is no longer computationalism. > > No. But what would force that conclusion on us ? Why can't > consciousness > attach to features more gneral than hardware, but less general than one > of your re-interpretations ? Because there is no natural or God-given computer architecture or language. You could say that consciousness does follow a natural architecture: that of the brain. But that could mean you would have a zombie if you tried to copy brain function with a digital computer, or with a digital computer not running Mr. Gates' operating system. Stathis Papaioannou _________________________________________________________________ Be one of the first to try Windows Live Mail. http://ideas.live.com/programpage.aspx?versionId=5d21c51a-b161-4314-9b0e-4911fb2b2e6d --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
