1Z wrote:
> Colin Geoffrey Hales wrote:
>> Stathis,
>>>> Whatever 'reality' is, it is regular/persistent,
>>>> repeatable/stable enough to do science on it via
>>>> our phenomenality and come
>>>> up with laws that seem to characterise how it will appear
>>>> to us in our phenomenality.
>>> You could say: my perceptions are
>>> regular/persistent/repeatable/stable enough to assume an
>>> external reality generating them and to do science on. And if
>>> a machine's central processor's perceptions are similarly
>>> regular/persistent/, repeatable/stable, it could also do
>>> science on them. The point is, neither I nor
>>> the machine has any magical knowledge of an external world.
>>> All we have is regularities in perceptions, which we assume
>>> to be originating from the external world because that's
>>> a good model which stands up no matter what we throw
>>> at it.
>> Oops. Maybe I spoke too soon! OK.
>> Consider... "...stable enough to assume an external reality..".
>> You are a zombie. What is it about sensory data that suggests an external
>> world?
> What is it about sensory data that suggests an external world to
> human?
> Well, of course, we have a phenomenal view. Bu there is no informtion
> in the phenomenal display that was not first in the pre-phenomenal
> sensory data.

No, I think Colin has point there.  Your phenomenal view adds a lot of 
assumptions to the sensory data in constructing an internal model of what you 
see.  These assumptions are hard-wired by evolution.  It is situations in which 
these assumptions are false that produce optical illusions.

Brent Meeker

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