Colin Hales writes:
> > You have described a way in which our perception may be more than can
> > be explained by the sense data. However, how does this explain the
> > response
> > to novelty? I can come up with a plan or theory to deal with a novel
> > situation
> > if it is simply described to me. I don't have to actually perceive
> > anything. Writers,
> > philosophers, mathematicians can all be creative without perceiving
> > anything.
> > Stathis Papaioannou
> Imaginative processes also use phenoenal consciousness. To have it
> described to you you had to use phenomenal consciousness. Once you dispose
> of PC you are model bound in all ways. You have to have a model to
> generate the novelty! PC pervades the whole process at all levels. Look
> what happens to Marvin. Even if he had someoine tell him there was an
> outide world he'd never know what the data was telling him.
I agree that phenomenal consciousness is no less essential for imaginative
processes than it is for direct environmental interaction. However, you have
proposed a mechanism whereby the connection between the brain and the
object of its perception cannot be modelled because it involves non-local
If that is so, then having something described to you or thinking it up de novo
bypasses this mechanism: it's just the cogs in your brain turning, eventually
producing efferent signals which move your vocal cords or your hands. How
does the brain working on its own escape those who would make a computer model?
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