Stathis said.... <<SNIP>> > and Colin has said that he does not believe that philosophical zombies can exist. > Hence, he has to show not only that the computer model will lack the 1st person > experience, but also lack the 3rd person observable behaviour of the real thing; > and the latter can only be the case if there is some aspect of brain physics which > does not comply with any possible mathematical model. > > Stathis Papaioannou
I just thought of a better way of explaining 'deviation'. Maxwell's equations are not 'unique' in the sense that there are an infinite number of different charge configurations that will produce the same field congurations around some surface. This is a very old result....was it Poisson who said it? can't remember. Anyway.... I will be presenting different objects to my 'chip scientists', but I will be presenting them in such a way as the sensory measurement is literally identical. What I expect to happen is that the field configuration I find emerging in the guts of the chips will be different, depending on the object, even though the sensory measurement is identical. The different field configurations will correspond to the different objects. That is what subjective experience will look like from the "outside". The chip's 'solution' to the charge cnfiguration will take up a configuration based on the non-locality...hence the scientists will report different objects, even when their sensory measurement is identical, and it is the only apparent access they have to the object (to us). I think that's more like what you are after... there's no "failure to obey" maxwell's equations, but their predictions as to charge configuration is not a unique solution. The trick is to realise that the sensory maeasurement has to be there in order that _any_ solution be found, not a _particular_ solution. pretty simple really. does that make more sense? cheers colin --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---