Le 26-déc.-06, à 23:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
I regard the idea of "believing" to be unsound, because it is a
pre-Freudian concept, which assumes that each person has a "single
self" that maintains beliefs.
Is this not a bit self-defeating? It has the form of a belief. Now I
can still agree, it depends of the meaning of "single self".
A more realistic view is that each
person is constantly switching among various different "ways to think"
in which different assertions, statements, or bodies of knowledge keep
changing their status, etc.
In that case I can completely agree. Even by modeling a machine's
belief by formal provability Bp by that machine, in the ideal case of
the self-referentially correct machine, like Peano Arithmetic, it will
follow that the "ontically equivalent" modalities Bp & p, Bp & Dp, etc.
obeys different logics so that they embodies different epistemological
status (and they are easy to confuse).
Now, when we are building a (meta)theory of "belief" we have to stick
on some possible sharable belief (in number theory, computer science,
perhaps physics: all that will depend on the hypotheses we accept) and
build from it. If not we could fall in exaggerated relativism.
Accordingly our "sets of beliefs" can
include many conflicts--and in different mental contexts, those
inconsistencies may get resolved in different ways, perhaps depending
on one's current priorities, etc.
OK. I would say that if someone can acknowledge the existence of a
conflict between beliefs, then he/she/it does acknowledge implicitly
that he/she/it bets on some *self*-consistency. If not he/she/it could
just accept its contradictory beliefs without further thoughts.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at