On Jul 6, 2:56 pm, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > It > is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable > first person view (making the comp-QM a bit more psychological than > some Many-Worlder would perhaps appreciate.

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Doesn't this strike you as perhaps consistent with what I've been saying about self-relation, or reflexive existence? IOW, quanta - as they appear to *us* (how else?) - exist reflexively. Comp, like any 'TOE', is a "gods' eye view", and I've been trying to convince Torgny that we shouldn't fool ourselves into mistaking such conceptions for modes of existing. We may nonetheless ask - with great care - "what might the consequences be if our situation were - in some (tricky) sense - to look like this from a gods' eye view?" But this is a (tricky, tricky) mode of enquiry, not a mode of existing. 'The One' is also a mode of enquiry (no less tricky, of course): it seems to suggest that the mode of existing of both the qualia and the quanta may be ineliminably reflexive: the splintering of a singular process of self-reflexion. Self: because there is no other; reflexion: because there is no other relation. David PS - It occurs to me that 'tricky' - which just happens to be the way these things strike me - seems quite consonant with the sort of 'reality gambles' that you (and Fuchs) propose. > Le 05-juil.-07, à 17:31, David Nyman a écrit : > > > On 05/07/07, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > > > BM: OK. I would insist that the "comp project" (extract physics from > > comp) > > is really just a comp obligation. This is what is supposed to be shown > > by the UDA (+ MOVIE-GRAPH). Are you OK with this. It *is* > > counterintuitive. > > > DN: I believe so - it's what the reductio ad absurdum of the > > 'physical' computation in the 'grandma' post was meant to show. > > This was not so clear, but OK. > > > My version of the 'comp obligation' would then run as follows. > > Essentially, if comp and number relations are held to be 'real in the > > sense that I am real', > > I am not sure that numbers are real in the sense that "I am real", > unless you are talking of the third person "I". Then "you" are as real > as your (unknown) Godel-number. > In general, when people use the word "I" they refer to their first > person, or to first person plural feature of their "physical" body. It > is a unexpected (by me) discovery that quanta belongs to that sharable > first person view (making the comp-QM a bit more psychological than > some Many-Worlder would perhaps appreciate. So that Fuch-Pauli could be > right ... (if you know the work of Fuchs). > > > then to use Plato's metaphor, it is numbers that represent the forms > > outside the cave. > > OK, but not only (there are also the relations between numbers, the > relation between the relations between the numbers, etc.) > > > If that's so, then physics is represented by the shadows the > > observers see on the wall of the cave. This is what I mean by > > 'independent' existence in my current dialogue with Torgny: i.e the > > 'arithmetical realism' of numbers and their relations in the comp > > frame equates to their 'independence' or self-relativity. And the > > existence of 'arithmetical observers' then derives from subsequent > > processes of 'individuation' intrinsic to such fundamental > > self-relation. Actually, I find the equation of existence with > > self-relativity highly intuitive. > > OK. (Technically it is not obvious how to define in arithmetic such > self-relation: the basic tool is given by the recursion or fixed point > theorems). > > > > > BM: Then, the interview of the universal machine is "just" a way to > > do the > > extraction of physics in a constructive way. It is really the > > subtleties of the incompleteness phenomena which makes this interview > > highly non trivial. > > > DN: This is the technical part. But at this stage grandma has some > > feeling for how both classical and QM narratives should be what we > > expect to emerge from constructing physics in this way. > > I am not sure how could grandma have a feeling about that, except if > grandma get Church Thesis and the UDA. > > > > > > > BM: There is no direct (still less one-one) correlation between the > > mental and the physical, > > that is the physical supervenience thesis is incompatible with the > > comp hyp. [A quale of a pain] felt at time t in place x, is not a > > product of the physical activity of a machine, at time t in place x. > > Rather, it is the whole quale of [a pain felt at time t in place x] > > which is associated > > with an (immaterial and necessarily unknown) computational state, > > itself related to its normal consistent computational continuations. > > > <snip> > > > Comp makes the "yes doctor" a gamble, necessarily. That is: assuming > > the "theory comp" you have to understand that, by saying yes to the > > doctor, you are gambling on a level of substitution. At the same time > > you make a "gamble" on the theory comp itself. There is double gamble > > here. Now, the first gamble, IF DONE AT THE RIGHT COMP SUBSTITUTION > > LEVEL, is comp-equivalent with the natural gamble everybody do when > > going to sleep, or just when waiting a nanosecond. In some sense > > "nature" do that gamble in our place all the time ... But this is > > somethjng we cannot know, still less assert in any scientific way, and > > that is why I insist so much on the "theological" aspect of comp. This > > is important in practice. It really justify that the truth of the "yes > > doctor" entails the absolute fundamental right to say NO to the > > doctor. The doctor has to admit he is gambling on a substitution > > level. If comp is > > true we cannot be sure on the choice of the subst. level. > > > DN: ISTM that a consequence of the above is that the issue of > > 'substitution level' can in principle be 'gambled' on by cloning, or > > by evolution (because presumably it has been, even though we can't say > > how). But by engineering or design??? Would there ever be any > > justification, in your view, for taking a gamble on being uploaded to > > an AI program - and if so, on the basis of what theory? > > Well, if you are willing to believe in "neurophilosophy", you can bet > on some high level description. If you bet on Hammerof's theory, you > have to duplicate the qunatum state of the brain (and this is of > courese not possible). I don't think we are concerned with those > practical matter. The point is just that physics appears as a sort of > sum on your lobian ignorance. > > > Essentially, this is what I've been trying to get at. That is: > > assuming comp, HOW would we go about making a 'sound bet', founded on > > a specific AI theory, that some AI program instantiated by a > > 'physical' computer, will equate to the continuity of our own > > observation? > > Before a long time (despite Kurzweyl) we just can do it, even at a high > level. A brain is *very* complex, for any theory. In the future people > will just bet on the available theory through some Pascal wag. > It is possible that there is some "zombie" gap, and that the first > person having an artificial brain will not be conscious ... (I doubt > this, but apparently the lobian machine say so .... according to the > definition I gave). > > > > > The second question I have is summarised in my recent posts about > > 'sense and 'action'. > > What you say is interesting, but honestly I am far from extracting > notion like "action" in the lobian frame. I have no time, nor space, > just bit of promising algebra confirming the quantum principle. > > > Essentially, I've been trying to postulate that the correlation of > > consciousness and physics is such that the relations between both sets > > of phenomena are a necessary entailment, not an additional > > assumption. ISTM that this is essential to avoid all the nonsense > > about zombies. > > As I said this is a point where I would like to disagree with the > lobian machine. The fact is that even the lobian machine warns us on > the possibility of zombie. Certainly the current artificial cops on the > road are zombie. Tomorrow we will be able to build artificial skin for > androids capable of making us believe they are normal humans citizens, > ... We should distinguish "local zombie" which are capable to fail you > during some finite time, and "theoretical global zombie" which are > capable to fail you, in principle, for ever (like Torgny try to make us > believe he belongs too: nobody can prove him wrong). > > > And not only this, but to show that the reciprocity between experience > > - e.g. suffering - and behaviour (indeed the whole entailment of > > 'intentionality') is a necessary consequence of fundamental > > self-relation (arithmetical relations, in the comp frame). > > I am not sure about that. Again you develop your intuition where I am > force to ask the machine, and I am far away to tackle a notion like > "behavior", except in very rough way (where a behavior would be defined > by a generable set of input-outputs). > Are you considering neural processing as a behavior? > Are you considering that some platonic and static relations between > numbers can be seen as behavior? > > > Now, my attempt to do this has been to postulate that 'sense' and > > 'action' are simply observer-related aspects of a non-decomposable > > fundamental self-relation, which in the comp frame would equate to a > > set of number-relations. But ISTM that for this to be true, the > > observer and physical narratives would somehow need to follow an > > 'identical' or isomorphic trajectory for their invariant relation to > > emerge in the way that it seems to. Do you think that this idea has > > any specific sense or relevance in the comp frame? > > Given that the physical is defined by the invariant of the observable, > it would be a pity not having such invariant, but I am a bit prisoner > of my methodology here. Feel free to pursue your intuitive exploration. > > > > > BM: Does this help? I assert some propositions without justifying > > them, > > because the justification are both already on the list, or in my > > papers. But, please, don't hesitate to ask for more if interested. From > > what I understand about your intuition, you are quite close to the > > "natural first person discourse" of the lobian machine. And the closer > > you are, the more severe my comments will be on the details, so please > > indulge my critical way of talking ... > > > Yes, absolutely! I feel I'm making progress in resolving some of the > > ambiguity in my understanding, so be as severe as necessary, cher > > maitre. > > Recall that the nameable lobian master always insist on "I will say a > stupidity or I could say a stupidity" (is that english?) > > :) > > Bruno --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---