[EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > > On Aug 28, 12:53 am, "Stathis Papaioannou" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> On 27/08/07, [EMAIL PROTECTED] <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: >> >> >> >> >> >>>> I accept that there is more than one way to describe reality, and I >>>> accept the concept of supervenience, but where I differ with you >>>> (stubbornly, perhaps) is over use of the word "fundamental". The base >>>> property seems to me more deserving of being called "fundamental" than >>>> the supervenient property. If you were to give concise instructions to >>>> a god who wanted to build a copy of our world you could skip all the >>>> information about values etc. confident in the knowledge that all this >>>> extra stuff would emerge as long as the correct physical information >>>> was conveyed; whereas the converse is not the case. >>>> [If the mental does not supervene on the physical this changes the >>>> particular example, but not the general point.] >>> Refer the brief definition of property dualism referenced by the link >>> Bruno gave: >>> http://www.jimpryor.net/teaching/courses/mind/notes/supervenience.html >>> Be careful to draw a distinction between 'substances' and >>> 'properties'. I accept that the underlying *substance* is likely >>> physical, but *properties* are what are super-imposed on the top of >>> the underlying substance. The physical *substance* may be the base >>> level, but the physical *properties* aren't. From the mere fact that >>> aesthetic properties are *composed of* physical substances, it does >>> not follow that aesthetic properties themselves are physical. Nor >>> does it follow from the fact that physical substances are *neccessery* >>> for aesthetic properties, that they are *sufficient* to fully specify >>> aesthetic properties. >>> Here's why: Complete knowledge of the physical properties of your >>> brain cannot in fact enable you to deduce your aesthetic preferences >>> without additional *non-physical* assumptions. That is because,as I >>> agreed with Bruno (see my previous post), all the explanatory power of >>> reason is *mathematical* in nature. In short, in order for you to >>> know how a complete specification of your brain state was correlated >>> with your aesthetic preferences, you would have to use your own >>> *subjective experiences* as a calibrator in order to make the >>> correlation (ie When brain state X, I feel/experience Y). And these >>> subjective experiences are not themsleves physical, but, as I have >>> explained again and again, *Mathematical* properties. >> There is this special quality of subjective experience: that which is >> left over after all the objective (third person knowable) information >> is accounted for. Nevertheless, the subjective experience can be >> perfectly reproduced by anyone who has at hand all the relevant third >> person information, even if it can't be reproduced in his own mind. >> You can build a bat which will to itself feel like a bat if you know >> every scientific detail about bats and have appropriately capable >> molecular assemblers at your disposal. > > Yes of course. But your ability to do this would not enable you to > determine what the bat was actually feeling solely from the physical > facts alone.
So you say. I'm not so sure. >(If you put matter together the right way, I agree you > will be able to create consciousness, but you won't be explain what > type of consciousness is created solely from physical data). So the > fact that subjective experience is entirely dependent on physical > substances does not provide a sufficient explanation of subjective > experience. > >> physical necessity unless you are a substance dualist, since the usual >> definition of supervenience says that same brain state implies same >> mind state. (It isn't a matter of logical necessity because property >> dualism is logically possible.) In this sense, the mental properties' >> dependence on the physical properties is asymmetrical, which is why I >> say the physical properties are more fundamental. You might agree with >> this analysis but simply have a different definition of "fundamental". > > I agree that mental properties are depedent on the physical > substance. The physical substance might be what is fundmanetal. But > physical *properties* are what emerge from the movements of the > underlying substance. Huh? How does gravitational mass emerge from movement? And what does "emerge" mean? >Futher there are other non-physical properties > which appear as well - mathematical for example. Is being countable a physical or a mathematical property? As I see it, mathematical and logical "properties" are properties of our descriptions of the things. They are desirable properties for any predictive description because they avoid self-contradiction; something that would render a prediction meaningless, but would be fine for a poem. > >> What if someone simply claimed that they couldn't see how circulation >> was the same as cardiovascular activity: they could understand that >> the heart was a pump, the blood a fluid, the blood vessels conduits, >> but the circulatory system as a whole was something emergent and not >> at all obvious, in the same way that mind was emergent. Alternatively, >> a superintelligent being could claim that the mind was as obviously >> the result of brain activity as circulation was the result of >> cardiovascular activity. >> >> -- >> Stathis Papaioannou > > Alternatively a superintelligent being might be quick to castigate you > for your stupidly and claim that I am right *sarcastic*. We have to > look at the facts based on the information at hand, not 'what if'. > You haven't answered the essential point, endorsed by one of the most > respected scientists in the world, Ray Kurzweil. Ray Kurzweil is a smart guy, but he's not a scientist and I doubt he even claims to be one. >This point is that > there's an essential difference between specific physical properties > (which can be objectively measured - as in the the exmaple of > circulation), and subjective experiences, which are not reducible to > specific physical properties You keep asserting that, but exactly the same thing was said about life. >(subjective experiences are a > *mathematical pattern* , and the same pattern could be enacted on > anything- you could have intelligent silicon, rocks, clouds or > anything. Further thesse patterns cannot be directly objectively > measured. Why can't such patterns be measured? If I create an intelligent computer, why can't I follow it's operation? > > If I would only make one essential argument here it is: > > It's known for a fact that there exist mathematical concepts (infinite > sets) which are indispensible to our explanations of reality but which > can't be explained in terms of any finite physical processes. I don't think so. Infinities in physical theories are just convenient approximations for something very big. Brent Meeker >This is > as clear-cut proof of the existence of non-material properties as > you're ever likely to see! Mathematical concepts simply are not > replaceable with physical descriptions. And subjective experiences > are precisely *mathemetical patterns*. > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
