Le 29-août-07, à 02:59, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :

> I *don't* think that mathematical
> properties are properties of our *descriptions* of the things.  I
> think they are properties *of the thing itself*.

I agree with you. If you identify "mathematical theories" with 
"descriptions", then the study of the description themselves is 
metamathematics or mathematical logic, and that is just a tiny part of 
After Godel, even formalists are obliged to take that distinction into 
account. We know for sure, today, that arithmetical truth cannot be 
described by a complete theory, only tiny parts of it can, and this 
despite the fact that we can have a pretty good intuition of what 
arithmetical truth is.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to