(Warning: This post assumes an familiarity with UD+ASSA and with the cosmological Measure Problem.)
Observational Consequences: 1. Provides a possible explanation for the "Measure Problem" of why we shouldn't be "extremely surprised" to find we live in a lawful universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous cloud of gas. 2. May help solve the Doomsday Argument in a finite universe, since you probably have at least a little more "measure" than a typical specific individual in the middle of a Galactic Empire, since you are "easier to find" with a small search algorithm than someone surrounded by enormous numbers of people. 3. For similar reasons, may help solve a variant of the Doomsday Argument where the universe is infinite. This variant DA asks, "if there's currently a Galactic Empire 10000 Hubble Volumes away with an immensely large number of people, why wasn't I born there instead of here?" 4. May help solve the Simulation Argument, again because a search algorithm to find a particular simulation among all the adjacent computations in a Galactic Empire is longer (and therefore, by UD +ASSA, has less measure) than a search algorithm to find you. 5. In basic UD+ASSA (on a typical Turing Machine), there is a probably a strict linear ordering corresponding to when the events at each point in spacetime were calculated; I would argue that we should expect to see evidence of this in our observations if basic UD+ASSA is true. However, we do not see any total ordering in the physical Universe; quite the reverse: we see a homogeneous, isotropic Universe. This is evidence (but not proof) that either UD+ASSA is completely wrong, or that if UD+ASSA is true, then it's run on something other than a typical linear Turing Machine. (However, if you still want use a different machine to solve the "Measure Problem", then feel free, but you first need to show that your non-Turing-machine variant still solves the "Measure Problem.") Decision Theory Consequences (Including Moral Consequences): Every decision algorithm that I've ever seen is prey to paradoxes where the decision theory either crashes (fails to produce a decision), or requires an agent to do things that are bizarre, self- destructive, and evil. (If you like, substitute 'counter-intuitive' for 'bizarre, self-destructive, and evil.') For example: UD+ASSA, "Accepting the Simulation Argument", Utilitarianism without discounting, and Utilitarianism with time and space discounting all have places where they seem to fail. UD+ASSA, like the Simulation Argument, has the following additional problem: while some forms of Utilitarianism may only fail in hypothetical future situations (by which point maybe we'll have come up with a better theory), UD+ASSA seems to fail *right here and now*. That is, UD+ASSA, like the Simulation Argument, seems to call on you to do bizarre, self-destructive, and evil things today. An example that Yudowsky gave: you might spend resources on constructing a unique arrow pointing at yourself, in order to increase your measure by making it easier for a search algorithm to find you. Of course, I could solve the problem by deciding that I'd rather be self-destructive and evil than be inconsistent; then I could consider adopting UD+ASSA as a philosophy. But I think I'll pass on that option. :-) So, more work would have to be done the morality of UD+ASSA before any variant of UD+ASSA can becomes a realistically palatable part of a moral philosophy. -Rolf --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
