Le 21-oct.-07, à 20:33, Rolf Nelson a écrit :

> (Warning: This post assumes an familiarity with UD+ASSA and with the
> cosmological Measure Problem.)

I am afraid you should say a little more on UD + ASSA. to make your 
points below clearer. I guess by UD you mean UDist (the universal 
distribution), but your remark remains a bit to fuzzy (at least for me) 
to comment.
Of course I am not convinced by ASSA at the start, but still. The 
absence of recation of ASSA defenders is perhaps a symptom that you are 
not completely clear for them too?


> Observational Consequences:
> 1. Provides a possible explanation for the "Measure Problem" of why we
> shouldn't be "extremely surprised" to find we live in a lawful
> universe, rather than an extremely chaotic universe, or a homogeneous
> cloud of gas.
> 2. May help solve the Doomsday Argument in a finite universe, since
> you probably have at least a little more "measure" than a typical
> specific individual in the middle of a Galactic Empire, since you are
> "easier to find" with a small search algorithm than someone surrounded
> by enormous numbers of people.
> 3. For similar reasons, may help solve a variant of the Doomsday
> Argument where the universe is infinite. This variant DA asks, "if
> there's currently a Galactic Empire 10000 Hubble Volumes away with an
> immensely large number of people, why wasn't I born there instead of
> here?"
> 4. May help solve the Simulation Argument, again because a search
> algorithm to find a particular simulation among all the adjacent
> computations in a Galactic Empire is longer (and therefore, by UD
> +ASSA, has less measure) than a search algorithm to find you.
> 5. In basic UD+ASSA (on a typical Turing Machine), there is a probably
> a strict linear ordering corresponding to when the events at each
> point in spacetime were calculated; I would argue that we should
> expect to see evidence of this in our observations if basic UD+ASSA is
> true. However, we do not see any total ordering in the physical
> Universe; quite the reverse: we see a homogeneous, isotropic Universe.
> This is evidence (but not proof) that either UD+ASSA is completely
> wrong, or that if UD+ASSA is true, then it's run on something other
> than a typical linear Turing Machine. (However, if you still want use
> a different machine to solve the "Measure Problem", then feel free,
> but you first need to show that your non-Turing-machine variant still
> solves the "Measure Problem.")
> Decision Theory Consequences (Including Moral Consequences):
> Every decision algorithm that I've ever seen is prey to paradoxes
> where the decision theory either crashes (fails to produce a
> decision), or requires an agent to do things that are bizarre, self-
> destructive, and evil. (If you like, substitute 'counter-intuitive'
> for 'bizarre, self-destructive, and evil.') For example: UD+ASSA,
> "Accepting the Simulation Argument", Utilitarianism without
> discounting, and Utilitarianism with time and space discounting all
> have places where they seem to fail.
> UD+ASSA, like the Simulation Argument, has the following additional
> problem: while some forms of Utilitarianism may only fail in
> hypothetical future situations (by which point maybe we'll have come
> up with a better theory), UD+ASSA seems to fail *right here and now*.
> That is, UD+ASSA, like the Simulation Argument, seems to call on you
> to do bizarre, self-destructive, and evil things today. An example
> that Yudowsky gave: you might spend resources on constructing a unique
> arrow pointing at yourself, in order to increase your measure by
> making it easier for a search algorithm to find you.
> Of course, I could solve the problem by deciding that I'd rather be
> self-destructive and evil than be inconsistent; then I could consider
> adopting UD+ASSA as a philosophy. But I think I'll pass on that
> option. :-)
> So, more work would have to be done the morality of UD+ASSA before any
> variant of UD+ASSA can becomes a realistically palatable part of a
> moral philosophy.
> -Rolf
> >

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