One more question: can or should p be the observer?
George Levy wrote:

> Hi Bruno,
> I am reopening an old thread ( more than a year old) which I found 
> very intriguing. It leads to some startling conclusions.
> Le 05-août-06, à 02:07, George Levy a écrit :
> Bruno Marchal wrote:I think that if you want to
>     make the first person primitive, given that neither you nor me can
>     really define it, you will need at least to axiomatize it in some
>     way.
>     Here is my question. Do you agree that a first person is a knower,
>     and
>     in that case, are you willing to accept the traditional axioms for
>     knowing. That is:
>     1) If p is knowable then p is true;
>     2) If p is knowable then it is knowable that p is knowable;
>     3) if it is knowable that p entails q, then if p is knowable then
>     q is
>     knowable
>     (+ some logical rules).
> Bruno, what or who do you mean by "it" in statements 2) and 3). In 
> addition, what do you mean by "is knowable", "is true" and "entails"? 
> Are "is knowable", "is true" and "entails" absolute or do they have 
> meaning only with respect to a particular observer? Can these terms be 
> relative to an observer? If they can, how would you rephrase these 
> statements?
> George
> >

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