On Nov 28, 3:16 am, Bruno Marchal <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Le 27-nov.-07, à 05:47, [EMAIL PROTECTED] a écrit :
> > Geometric properties cannot be derived from
> > informational properties.
> I don't see why. Above all, this would make the computationalist wrong,
> or at least some step in the UDA wrong (but then which one?).
I'll find the flaw in UDA in due course ;)
> I recall that there is an argument (UDA) showing that if comp is true,
> then not only geometry, but physics, has to be derived exclusively from
> numbers and from what numbers can prove (and know, and observe, and
> bet, ...) about themselves, that is from both extensional and
> intensional number theory.
> The UDA shows *why* physics *has to* be derived from numbers (assuming
> CT + "yes doctor").
> The Lobian interview explains (or should explain, if you have not yet
> grasp the point) *how* to do that.
If the UDA is sound that would certainly refute what I'm claiming
yes. I want to see how physics (which as far I'm concerned *is*
geometry - at least I think pure physics=geometry) emerges *purely*
from theories of sets/numbers/categories.
I base my claims on ontological considerations (5 years of deep
thought about ontology), which lead me to strongly suspect the
irreducible property dualism between physical and mathematical
properties. Thus I'm highly skeptical of UDA but have yet to property
study it. Lacking resources to do proper study here at the
Time will tell.
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