From your link.
Does 'any theory' in the following quote include theories that involve
logics with every MV-algebra as their truth set and every set of
syntactical axioms or is this just any theory using binary logic?
Could Russell have proved anything in the context of even
paraconsistent logic, not to mention all non-classical logics (such as
those that were revealed in the 50's or so), using what he might have
known at his time?
As was discovered by Russell, any theory that contains the
Comprehension Schema is inconsistent. For putting 'y not-element y'
for A in the Comprehension Schema and instantiating the existential
quantifier to an arbitrary such object 'r' gives:....
On Mar 22, 7:48 pm, Brian Tenneson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> I'm going to have to look into the question "has my, or a similar,
> question been answered yet" as I honestly don't know for sure. I
> would be really happy if it was answered, in some sense, because
> whether or not I answer it, I am still curious about the answer.
> Thanks for posting that.
> On Mar 22, 7:36 pm, <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> > > My main
> > > goal is that I seem to need to show that such a fuzzy set theory, one
> > > with a "universal set," is ++consistent relative to ZFC++ or at
> > > least
> > > prove that that's not possible (ie, prove a generalization of
> > > Russell's "paradox").
> > It is proved in Paraconsistent Logic:
> > http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-paraconsistent/#MatSig
> > _____________________________________________________________________________
> > Envoyez avec Yahoo! Mail. Capacité de stockage illimitée pour vos
> > emails.http://mail.yahoo.fr
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