Hi Günther,

On 25 Dec 2008, at 20:01, Günther Greindl wrote:

>
> Bruno,
>
>>> This conception can, I think, be indeed taken for granted by every
>>> scientifically minded person.
>>
>> Why ? It is an assumption too. What could we taken it for granted?
>
> Yes, it is an assumption - that is why is wrote "scientifically  
> minded"
> - if you are in any way naturalist (and all the more if you are
> materialist), then you can assume the above.

I would say that a scientific mind don't take anything for granted,  
especially when very big problem are still unsolved.
The little progress I try to describe shows that most scientist are  
wrong on the mind body question, and actually even only on the matter  
question.



>
>
>> And this assumption is quite close to comp in the sense that nobody
>> knows about
>> any "natural" machine not being turing emulable. Even quantum  
>> machine,
>> accepting QM without collapse.
>
> That is true, but we have to be careful in our reasoning.
>
> Look at Thesis M:
>
> http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/church-turing/#Bloopers
>
> That is quite different from CT. And while the two may be identical in
> the real world (empirical question), they are logically distinct.



That link does not define "machine" and I don't know what he talks  
about. It described confusing misunderstandings of Church thesis, but  
his comments are even more confusing, and some does not make any sense  
if we take the UD Argument into account.

If by machine, the paper means "physical machine", then COMP implies  
stricto senso that the thesis M is false.
COMP implies that the observable physical vacuum is already not Turing  
emulable (as opposed to the multiverse description of the vacuum,  
which of course does not belongs to the observable realm (we can't  
step out of the multiverse).


>
> (and, as you can read in the article, hypercomp would refute comp,


Not at all. But this would be a technical digression. We could come  
back when I am sure most get the UDA point.


>
> showing that logical distinction remains even if we can let them
> coincide in this universe).
>
>> All known physical causal system are Turing emulable.
>
> Yes - "known". There could be others (I don't believe it, but there  
> could).
>
>> I don't see why this COMP has to be assumed, and not the other
>> slightly enlarged version.
>> Both are assumption.
>
> Agreed - but many more scientists will be prepared to assume the first
> and not COMP. It is simply the difference between materialism and
> computationalism, and most natural scientists are materialists.


Most are both computationalist and materialist. UDA shows that they  
are wrong.



>
>
>> And none of KIM 2.1 (= UDA 1), nor KIM.2.3 (= UDA 3) assumes the
>> digitality. This is done at step 7. We used only  the replicability.
>
> ok, no problem. Just wanted to clear up terminology.
>
>> I agree that the UDA does not apply to natural machine whose function
>> cannot be replicated. But nobody has ever seen or even conceive  
>> such a
>> machine. You have to assume a non repeatable phenomenon, hard to get
>> from QM without collapse.
>
> Indeed - it would for instance be Penrose style Quantum grav collapse.
>
>> That is "non comp", but I doubt Harnad
>> believe in such non-comp. He has to say explicitely the machine have
>> non replicable functions, it seems to me.
>
> Harnad does not clarify further in the paper which version he  
> endorses -
> the quote was just very nice to introduce a physcial version of CT
> (thesis M).


OK. Just remember that a priori comp makes the thesis M wrong.

Bruno


http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/




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