Jack, Wei Dai,
> machines are invented, there will be a much greater selection pressure
> towards U=M*Q. But given that U=Q is closer to the reality today, I'm not
> sure what good it would do to "taking a stand against QS/QI".
U=M*Q is 3rd person POV (hypothetical; viewed from outside
platonia/spacetime worm/insert fav. metaphysics)
U=Q is 1st POV (a cognitive agent reasoning if he/she/it will have next
Again, it seems that QI is conceded, and an emotional argument made to
care for all successors. I see no contradiction, and no refutation or
whatever of QI.
>The real key point at which the QS fallacy appears seems to be that
>some people find it inconcievable that they will not have a future.
Having only a finite number of successor moments is standard materialist
assumption. It is computationalism which seems to suggest otherwise.
Inconceivability does not enter the picture.
>Thus, they assume that they will survive and only need to take into
>account effective probabilities that are conditional on survival.
That is correct, as not surviving is not an experience. As long as a
successor with "your" memories of previous moments exists, you survive.
> 5) The groggy mornings
>If he were immortal, then his expected age would diverge, and the
>‘chance’ that his age would be normal is 0%.
Ok, this is ASSA reasoning. But it does not follow with RSSA. So, it is
just the old argument that with ASSA you don't have immortality but with
RSSA you do?
A "refutation" of QI would also require refuting it under RSSA,
otherwise you simply have claim _if_ ASSA _then_ no QI, which does not
As written in a previous post, I think an RSSA-reasoner should also care
for all his successors, and thus not engage in a QS-experiment or stuff
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at