Jack, Wei Dai,

> machines are invented, there will be a much greater selection pressure 
> towards U=M*Q. But given that U=Q is closer to the reality today, I'm not 
> sure what good it would do to "taking a stand against QS/QI".

To "translate":
U=M*Q is 3rd person POV (hypothetical; viewed from outside 
platonia/spacetime worm/insert fav. metaphysics)

U=Q is 1st POV (a cognitive agent reasoning if he/she/it will have next 
experience)

Again, it seems that QI is conceded, and an emotional argument made to 
care for all successors. I see no contradiction, and no refutation or 
whatever of QI.

 >The real key point at which the QS fallacy appears seems to be that 
 >some people find it inconcievable that they will not have a future.

Having only a finite number of successor moments is standard materialist 
assumption. It is computationalism which seems to suggest otherwise. 
Inconceivability does not enter the picture.

 >Thus, they assume that they will survive and only need to take into 
 >account effective probabilities that are conditional on survival.

That is correct, as not surviving is not an experience. As long as a 
successor with "your" memories of previous moments exists, you survive.

 > 5) The groggy mornings
 >If he were immortal, then his expected age would diverge, and the 
 >‘chance’ that his age would be normal is 0%.

Ok, this is ASSA reasoning. But it does not follow with RSSA. So, it is 
just the old argument that with ASSA you don't have immortality but with 
RSSA you do?

A "refutation" of QI would also require refuting it under RSSA, 
otherwise you simply have claim _if_ ASSA _then_ no QI, which does not 
seem disputed.

As written in a previous post, I think an RSSA-reasoner should also care 
for all his successors, and thus not engage in a QS-experiment or stuff 
like that.

Cheers,
Günther

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