At 07:31 AM 3/6/2009, Stathis Papaioannou wrote:

>2009/3/6 Jack Mallah <> wrote:
> >> If you're not worried about the fair trade, 
> then to be consistent you shouldn't be worried 
> about the unfair trade either. In the fair 
> trade, one version of you A disappears 
> overnight, and a new version of you B is 
> created elsewhere in the morning. The unfair 
> trade is the same, except that there is an 
> extra version of you A' which disappears 
> overnight. Now why should the *addition* of 
> another version make you nervous when you wouldn't have been nervous 
> otherwise?
> >
> > It's not the addition of the other copy 
> that's the problem; it's the loss of it. Â Losing people is bad.
>How would the addition then loss of the extra copy be bad for the
>original, or for that matter for the disappearing extra copy, given
>that neither copy has any greater claim to being resurrected in the
>morning as B?
> >> That Riker's measure increased is not the 
> important thing here: it is that the two Rikers 
> differentiated. Killing one of them after they 
> had differentiated would be wrong, but killing 
> one of them before they had differentiated would be OK.
> >
> > That would be equivalent to U = Sum_i Q_i in 
> which no changes in the wavefunction matter at 
> all, since M_i > 0 for all i no matter what. Â 
> I don't think you thought that one through.
>I don't agree with the way you calculate utility at all. If I got $5
>every time I pressed a button which decreased my absolute measure in
>the multiverse a millionfold I would happily press the button all day.
>It would be easy money and I'd feel exactly the same afterwards, just
>$5 richer. On the other hand, if pressing the button decreased the
>measure of those versions of me having good experiences by 1% relative
>to the versions of me having bad experiences, then I wouldn't press
>it, and certainly not repeatedly.
>Stathis Papaioannou

I've been following this discussion and have a 
comment re absolute measure in the 
multiverse.  The assumption is the same one David 
Deutsch has expressed: other than the 
interference observed in the Young's experiment, 
there can be no contact between the multiverses.

However, suppose our consciousness was 
essentially a topological object---a fibre bundle 
through a manifold of similar universes?  The 
universes where things are remarkably different 
would be ignored by the observer in favor of the 
probabilistic "picture of reality" associated 
with the median experience bundle.  Focusing on 
the "volume section" of such a distribution might 
be the function of an entity such as Hilgard's 
hidden observer <<>>.

In this model, the platform for consciousness is 
simply a manifold formed by equivalent behavioral 
elements across the multiverse (no pun 
intended.)  Eliminating them one by one would 
result in a commensurate decrease in overall consciousness.

Richard Miller

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