2009/4/20 Kelly <harmon...@gmail.com>: > > What is the advantage of assigning consciousness to computational > processes (e.g. UDA), as opposed to just assigning it to the > information that is produced by computational processes? > > For example, to take Maudlin's "Computation and Consciousness" paper, > if you just say that the consciousness is found in the information > represented by the arrangement of the empty or full water troughs, > then that basically removes the problem he is pointing out. > > Similarly, associated consciousness only with information seems to > resolve problems with random processes interfering with the causal > structure of physically implemented computations which then, despite > having the causal chain interrupted, would still seem to produce > consciousness. (more on the irrelevance of causality: > http://platonicmindscape.blogspot.com/2009/02/irrelevance-of-causality.html) > > Bruno Marchal has mentioned this in his movie graph argument, where a > cosmic ray interrupts a logical operation in a transistor on a > computer that is running a brain simulation, but due to good fortune > the result of the operation is still correct despite the break in the > causal chain that produced the answer. > > Conscious being associated with information would also seem to address > the problems with Davidson's "swampman" scenario, and the related > quantum swampman scenario (http://platonicmindscape.blogspot.com/ > 2009/03/quantum-swampman.html). > > So, many different programs can produce the same information, using > many different algorithms, optimizations, shortcuts, etc. But if all > of these programs all accurately simulate the same brain, then they > should produce the same conscious experience, regardless of the > various implementation details. > > The most obvious thing that all such programs would have in common is > that they work with the same information...the state of the brain at > each given time slice. Even if this state is stored in different > forms by each of the various programs, there must always be a mapping > between those various storage formats, as well as a mapping back to > the original brain whose activity is being simulated. > > Therefore, it seems better to me to say: Consciousness is > information, not the processes that produce the information. > > What are the drawbacks of this view when contrasted with > computationalism?
The drawback is that any physical system (which could be mapped onto any information or any computation) would be conscious. This is only a drawback if you believe, I guess as a matter of faith, that it is false. -- Stathis Papaioannou --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to firstname.lastname@example.org To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---