Stathis Papaioannou wrote:
> 2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux <>:
>>>> In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't
>>>> in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My
>>>> view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness,
>>>> that you can't slice consciousness arbitrarily finely in time.
>>> Could the question be settled by actual experiment, i.e. asking the
>>> subject if they noticed anything unusual?
>>> --
>>> Stathis Papaioannou
>> For this you would need an actual AI and also that everybody agreed on
>> the fact that this AI is conscious and not a zombie.
>> If you can settle that, then an interview should be counted as proof.
>> But I'm not sure you can prove the AI is conscious, nor with the same
>> argument I'm not sure I could prove to you that I am.
> Well, you could just ask the teleported human. If he says he feels
> fine, didn't notice anything other than the scenery changing, would
> that count for anything? I suppose you could argue that of course he
> would say that since a gap in consciousness is by definition not
> noticeable, 

I see no contradiction in a "noticeable gap in consciousness".  Whether  
noticing such a gap depends on having some theory of the world or is 
intrinsic seems to be the question.


> but then you end up with a variant of the zombie argument:
> he says everything feels OK, but in actual fact he experiences
> nothing.

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