Stathis Papaioannou wrote: > 2009/4/29 Quentin Anciaux <[email protected]>: > > >>>> In Bruno's Washington/Moscow thought experiment that information isn't >>>> in your consciousness, although it's available via third persons. My >>>> view of the experiment is that you would lose a bit of consciousness, >>>> that you can't slice consciousness arbitrarily finely in time. >>>> >>> Could the question be settled by actual experiment, i.e. asking the >>> subject if they noticed anything unusual? >>> >>> >>> -- >>> Stathis Papaioannou >>> >> For this you would need an actual AI and also that everybody agreed on >> the fact that this AI is conscious and not a zombie. >> >> If you can settle that, then an interview should be counted as proof. >> But I'm not sure you can prove the AI is conscious, nor with the same >> argument I'm not sure I could prove to you that I am. >> > > Well, you could just ask the teleported human. If he says he feels > fine, didn't notice anything other than the scenery changing, would > that count for anything? I suppose you could argue that of course he > would say that since a gap in consciousness is by definition not > noticeable,
I see no contradiction in a "noticeable gap in consciousness". Whether noticing such a gap depends on having some theory of the world or is intrinsic seems to be the question. Brent > but then you end up with a variant of the zombie argument: > he says everything feels OK, but in actual fact he experiences > nothing. > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
