Kelly wrote: > On Apr 24, 2:41 am, Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> wrote: > >>> In the materialist view, my mental state is just the >>> state of the particles of my brain at that instant. >>> >> I think we need some definition of "state". >> > > Hmmm. Well, I think my view of the word is pretty much the dictionary > definition. Though there are two different meanings in play here. > > The physical state: > > "the condition of matter with respect to structure, form, > constitution, phase, or the like" > > And the mental state: > > "a particular condition of mind or feeling" > > Though ultimately I'm saying that there is no actual physical world > that exists outside of and independent from our perceptions. You and > I probably perceive a very similar world, but there other conscious > observers who perceive very different worlds. But all worlds are > virtual worlds that exist only inside the minds of conscious platonic > observers. And I base this conclusion on the line of thought laid out > in my previous posts. > > > >> If we discretize your brain, say slice it into Planck >> units of time as Jason suggested, now we need to >> have something to connect one state to another. >> > > Why do we need to have something extra to connect one state to > another? What does this add, exactly? > > I think that these instances of consciousness are like pieces from a > picture puzzle. But not a jigsaw picture puzzle...instead let's say > that each puzzle piece is perfectly square, and they combine to make > the full picture. > > How do you know where each piece fits into the overall picture? By > the contents of the image fragment that is on each puzzle piece. > > So each puzzle piece has, contained within it, the information that > indicates it's position in the larger framework. The same is true of > instances of consciousness. > > Based on how well the edges of their "images" line up, you can get > some idea about the relationship between two instances of > consciousness. >
These are "edges" in time, i.e. a future boundary and a past boundary. If these two boundaries are different then we are not longer talking about a state, we're talking about an interval, furthermore an interval that has duration and direction. > > >> In idealism, the content of a state consciousness (a Planck slice, not >> of a brain, but of a stream of consciousness) seems to me to be very >> small >> > > Well, I'm not sure how much of the brain's information is needed to > represent a particular state of consciousness. But I don't think that > it's a crucial question. It's a crucial question if the answer is "more than what is in an instant of consciousness." Brent > My answer is: more than none of it, but > less-than-or-equal-to all of it. Somewhere in that range. Ha! > > > >> You say it is >> connected by the correlation of information content, but is that >> unique? Is there a best or most probable next state or what? >> > > So I guess I'm taking the position of "extreme platonism" here. The > result is, I suppose, indistinguishable from that of modal realism. > > All possible "next states" exist. None of them are "best" or "more > probable" than any other. Every possible future lies ahead of you, > and some version of you will experience each one of them. There will > be a version of you that never sees anything that strikes you as > unusual and who says "the universe is very normal, and this all makes > perfect sense, and how could it be any other way. These people who > advocate extreme platonism are crazy, because it doesn't match what I > observe." > > But, there will also be a version of you who never has a normal > experience again. For eternity you will go from strange experience to > strange experience. And this version will say, "ah, ya, Kelly was > right about that extreme platonism thing." > > And there will be all points between the two extremes. > > Though, I think that this view does make a testable prediction. Which > is: there will be no end to your experiences. There is no permanent > first person death. > > Of course, many realities will be unpleasant enough that this isn't > necessarily a good thing. All good things lie before you. But so do > all bad things. Blerg. > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
