On May 14, 4:45 pm, Colin Hales <[email protected]> wrote: > > At the same time position 1 completely fails to explain an > observer of the kind able to do 1a.
I would say that position 2 fails to explain the observer too, you have to actually explain the observer to claim that a position explains the observer. But position 2 at least provides the topology to allow doubt, so that there is room for an observer to be explained in the future. > ... > Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ... > and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2 > remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity. If what you mean by religiosity is the disallowance of doubt, then yes by definition position 1 has religiosity and position 2 does not. I agree that disallowance of doubt is not a good thing to have. I think you said that physicists would also agree, but that they don't practice that way. I think it's just a matter of frame of mind. In math we do that a lot, where we suppose that something is true and see where it leads. I guess in physics the supposing just lasts longer. And the supposing in physics is in the form of math. What other form could supposing in physics possibly take? It seems that anything you suppose true you can put in the form of a mathematics statement. I think it all boils down to the fact that we have to keep remembering that we were just supposing, and be able to step back out of it and suppose something else. I think that's where having lots of people it an advantage, some people are the really dedicated logical inference one step at a time see where the supposition leads, do many experiments, etc. Other people are the broad brush outside of the box thinkers that think up lots of different possibilites. > Hmmm. Just in case there's a misunderstanding of position 2, here's > their contrast rather more pointedly: > > Position 1 > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > when we look. > 1b Reality is literally made of the mathematics 1a. (I act as if this > were the case) > > Position 2 > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > when we look. > 1b There's a *separate* mathematics of an underlying reality which > operates to produce an observer who sees the reality behaving as per 1a > maths. > 1c There's the actual underlying reality, which is doubted (not claimed) > to 'be' 1b or 1a. > I think that your first description of position 2 seemed to necessitate some kind of basic matter that things are made of. But I think your second description of position 2 (above, by the way, 2a, 2b, 2c typo above) doesn't necessarily require that. In face your 2c above says that the underlying reality is doubted to be 1b or 1a. I think that your doubt and underlying reality could all be placed in 2b instead and you could get rid of 2c. I think that Bruno's G might correspond to 2a and G* might correspond to 2b, and viola, comp! Tom --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
