On May 14, 9:47 pm, [email protected] wrote: > On May 14, 4:45 pm, Colin Hales <[email protected]> wrote: > > > > > At the same time position 1 completely fails to explain an > > observer of the kind able to do 1a. > > I would say that position 2 fails to explain the observer too, you > have to actually explain the observer to claim that a position > explains the observer. But position 2 at least provides the topology > to allow doubt, so that there is room for an observer to be explained > in the future. > > > ... > > Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ... > > and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2 > > remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity. > > If what you mean by religiosity is the disallowance of doubt, then yes > by definition position 1 has religiosity and position 2 does not. I > agree that disallowance of doubt is not a good thing to have. I think > you said that physicists would also agree, but that they don't > practice that way. I think it's just a matter of frame of mind. In > math we do that a lot, where we suppose that something is true and see > where it leads. I guess in physics the supposing just lasts longer. > And the supposing in physics is in the form of math. What other form > could supposing in physics possibly take? It seems that anything you > suppose true you can put in the form of a mathematics statement. I > think it all boils down to the fact that we have to keep remembering > that we were just supposing, and be able to step back out of it and > suppose something else. I think that's where having lots of people it > an advantage, some people are the really dedicated logical inference > one step at a time see where the supposition leads, do many > experiments, etc. Other people are the broad brush outside of the box > thinkers that think up lots of different possibilites. > > > > > > > Hmmm. Just in case there's a misunderstanding of position 2, here's > > their contrast rather more pointedly: > > > Position 1 > > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > > when we look. > > 1b Reality is literally made of the mathematics 1a. (I act as if this > > were the case) > > > Position 2 > > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves > > when we look. > > 1b There's a *separate* mathematics of an underlying reality which > > operates to produce an observer who sees the reality behaving as per 1a > > maths. > > 1c There's the actual underlying reality, which is doubted (not claimed) > > to 'be' 1b or 1a. > > I think that your first description of position 2 seemed to > necessitate some kind of basic matter that things are made of. But I > think your second description of position 2 (above, by the way, 2a, > 2b, 2c typo above) doesn't necessarily require that. In face your 2c > above says that the underlying reality is doubted to be 1b or 1a. I > think that your doubt and underlying reality could all be placed in 2b > instead and you could get rid of 2c. I think that Bruno's G might > correspond to 2a and G* might correspond to 2b, and viola, comp! > > Tom>
i.e. in the case where you put the doubt and underlying reality into 2b, then G* could correspond to 2b. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
