On May 14, 9:47 pm, daddycay...@msn.com wrote:
> On May 14, 4:45 pm, Colin Hales <c.ha...@pgrad.unimelb.edu.au> wrote:
> > At the same time  position 1 completely fails to explain an
> > observer of the kind able to do 1a.
> I would say that position 2 fails to explain the observer too, you
> have to actually explain the observer to claim that a position
> explains the observer.  But position 2 at least provides the topology
> to allow doubt, so that there is room for an observer to be explained
> in the future.
> > ...
> > Yet position 1 behaviour stops you from finding position 2 ...
> > and problems unsolved because they are only solvable by position 2
> > remain unsolved merely because of 1b religiosity.
> If what you mean by religiosity is the disallowance of doubt, then yes
> by definition position 1 has religiosity and position 2 does not.  I
> agree that disallowance of doubt is not a good thing to have.  I think
> you said that physicists would also agree, but that they don't
> practice that way.  I think it's just a matter of frame of mind.  In
> math we do that a lot, where we suppose that something is true and see
> where it leads.  I guess in physics the supposing just lasts longer.
> And the supposing in physics is in the form of math.  What other form
> could supposing in physics possibly take?  It seems that anything you
> suppose true you can put in the form of a mathematics statement.  I
> think it all boils down to the fact that we have to keep remembering
> that we were just supposing, and be able to step back out of it and
> suppose something else.  I think that's where having lots of people it
> an advantage, some people are the really dedicated logical inference
> one step at a time see where the supposition leads, do many
> experiments, etc.  Other people are the broad brush outside of the box
> thinkers that think up lots of different possibilites.
> > Hmmm. Just in case there's a misunderstanding of position 2, here's
> > their contrast rather more pointedly:
> > Position 1
> > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves
> > when we look.
> > 1b Reality is literally made of the mathematics 1a. (I act as if this
> > were the case)
> > Position 2
> > 1a There's a mathematics which describes how the natural world behaves
> > when we look.
> > 1b There's a *separate* mathematics of an underlying reality which
> > operates to produce an observer who sees the reality behaving as per 1a
> > maths.
> > 1c There's the actual underlying reality, which is doubted (not claimed)
> > to 'be' 1b or 1a.
> I think that your first description of position 2 seemed to
> necessitate some kind of basic matter that things are made of.  But I
> think your second description of position 2 (above, by the way, 2a,
> 2b, 2c typo above) doesn't necessarily require that.  In face your 2c
> above says that the underlying reality is doubted to be 1b or 1a.  I
> think that your doubt and underlying reality could all be placed in 2b
> instead and you could get rid of 2c.  I think that Bruno's G might
> correspond to 2a and G* might correspond to 2b, and viola, comp!
> Tom>

i.e. in the case where you put the doubt and underlying reality into
2b, then G* could correspond to 2b.

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