On Sun, May 24, 2009 at 1:54 AM, Bruno Marchal <[email protected]> wrote: > > May be you could study the UDA, and directly tell me at which step > your "theory" departs from the comp hyp.
Okay, I read over your SANE2004 paper again. >From step 1 of UDA: "The scanned (read) information is send by traditional means, by mails or radio waves for instance, at Helsinki, where you are correctly reconstituted with ambient organic material." Okay, so this information that is sent by traditional means is really I think where consciousness lives. Though not literally in the physical instantiation of the information. For instance if you were to print out that information in some format, I would NOT point to the large pile of ink-stained paper and say that it was conscious. But would say that the information that is represented by that pile of ink and paper "represents", or "identifies", or "points to" a single instant of consciousness. So, what is the information? Well, let's say the data you're transmitting is from a neural scan and consists of a bunch of numbers indicating neural connection weights, chemical concentrations, molecular positions and states, or whatever. I wouldn't even say that this information is the information that is conscious. Instead this information is ultimately an encoding (via the particular way that the brain stores information) of the symbols and the relationships between those symbols that represent your knowledge, beliefs, and memories (all of the information that makes you who you are). (Echoes here of the Latent Semantic Analysis (LSA) stuff that I referenced before) >From step 8 of UDA: "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to a type or a sheaf of computations (existing forever in the arithmetical Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of our selves with arithmetical realism)." So instead I would write this as: "Instead of linking [the pain I feel] at space-time (x,t) to [a machine state] at space-time (x,t), we are obliged to associate [the pain I feel at space-time (x,t)] to an [informational state] existing forever in Platonia which is accepted as existing independently of ourselves." > You have to see that, personally, I don't have a theory other than the > assumption that the brain is emulable by a Turing machine I also believe that, but I think that consciousness is in the information represented by the discrete states of the data stored on the Turing machine's tape after each instruction is executed, NOT in the actual execution of the Turing machine. The instruction table of the Turing machine just describes one possible way that a particular sequence of information states could be produced. Execution of the instructions in the action table actually doesn't do anything with respect to the production of consciousness. The output informational states represented by data on tape exists platonically even if the Turing machine program is never run. And therefore the consciousness that goes with those states also exists platonically, even if the Turing machine program is never run. > OK. So, now, Kelly, just to understand what you mean by your theory, I > have to ask you what your theory predicts in case of self- > multiplication. Well, first I'd say there aren't copies of identical information in Platonia. All perceived physical representations all actually point to (similarly to a C-style pointer in programming) the same platonically existing information state. So if there are 1000 identical copies of me in identical mental states, they are really just representations of the same "source" information state. Piles of atoms aren't conscious. Information is conscious. 1000 identically arranged piles of atoms still represent only a single information state (setting aside putnam mapping issues). The information state is conscious, not the piles of atoms. However, once their experiences diverge so that they are no longer identical, then they are totally seperate and they represent (or point to) seperate, non-overlapping conscious information states. > To see where does those probabilities come from, you have to > understand that 1) you can be multiplied (that is read, copy (cut) and > pasted in Washington AND Moscow (say)), and 2) you are multiplied (by > 2^aleph_zero, at each instant, with a comp definition of instant not > related in principle with any form of physical time). Well, probability is a tricky subject, right? An interesting quote: "Whereas the interpretation of quantum mechanics has only been puzzling us for ~75 years, the interpretation of probability has been doing so for more than 300 years [16, 17]. Poincare [18] (p. 186) described probability as "an obscure instinct". In the century that has elapsed since then philosophers have worked hard to lessen the obscurity. However, the result has not been to arrive at any consensus. Instead, we have a number of competing schools (for an overview see Gillies [19], von Plato [20], Sklar [21, 22] and Guttman [23])." (http://arxiv.org/PS_cache/quant-ph/pdf/0402/0402015v1.pdf) > The fact is that your explanation, that we are in an typical universe, > because those exist as well, just does not work with the comp hyp. It > does not work, because it does not explain why we REMAIN in that > typical worlds. Some Brunos will remain in typical worlds, and never see any other type of world. But other Brunos are finding themselves in white-rabbit-worlds at every instant. You are a "typical world Bruno", and there will ALWAYS be typical world Brunos who ask "If Kelly's theory is correct why am I still in a typical world?" And the answer is, since every possible Bruno exists, there must exist some Brunos who only see typical worlds. So with this in mind, how could some Brunos NOT REMAIN in a typical world? What could possibly explain the absence of all "typical world Brunos"? > It seems to me that, as far as I can put meaning on > your view, the probability I will see a white rabbit in two seconds is > as great than the probability I will see anything else, and this is in > contradiction with the fact. What makes us staying in apparent lawful > histories? The probability that a Bruno will see a white rabbit in 2 seconds is 100%. The probability that a Bruno will NOT see a white rabbit in 2 seconds is ALSO 100%. The key part here is the use of "a", as in "a Bruno". Future Brunos are independent of "present Bruno", except for their memory of you. Again, there's nothing "real" that ties together instants of consciousness except for the "feeling" of continuity that's provided by memory. So with probability, you're asking "what is the likelyhood that I will see X as opposed to Y". But YOU aren't going to see anything, you're tied to the present. Some future version of you will see X. And a different future version of you will see Y. And there will be other future versions of you that see A through W also. So here I guess we get into issues of personal identity over time, and maybe also questions of transworld identity. From SEP (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/identity-personal/): "What does it take for a person to persist from one time to another—that is, for the same person to exist at different times? What sorts of adventures could you possibly survive, in the broadest sense of the word 'possible'? What sort of event would necessarily bring your existence to an end? What determines which past or future being is you? Suppose you point to a child in an old class photograph and say, “That's me.” What makes you that one, rather than one of the others? What is it about the way she relates then to you as you are now that makes her you? For that matter, what makes it the case that anyone at all who existed back then is you? This is the question of personal identity over time. An answer to it is an account of our persistence conditions, or a criterion of personal identity over time (a constitutive rather than an evidential criterion: the second falls under the Evidence Question below)." > What does you theory predict about agony and death, from the first > person point of view? Well, I'm guessing that there is no first person death. We are all subjectively immortal, and all possible futures await. Some of them very bad. Some of them very good. In one of my futures I will never experience a good thing again. It will be nothing but suffering, misery, and humiliation for eternity. BUT, on the plus side, in another future I will never experience another bad thing again. It's blue skies and flowers for as far as the eye can see. Most futures will be some mix of the two. To be honest, the thought of the good futures doesn't make up for the thought of the bad futures. BUT, such is life. I suspect. --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
