On 29 May 2009, at 18:53, Kelly Harmon wrote:
> On Thu, May 28, 2009 at 3:49 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be>
>> What do you thing is the more probable events that you will live
>> one is the more probable? What is your most rational choice among
> So if nothing is riding on the outcome of my choice, then it seems
> rational to choose the option that will make me right in the most
> futures, which is option 6, white noise.
What a relief ...
> If there's one world for
> each unique pattern of pixels,
It is more or less explicit in the ideal protocol of the experience.
> then most of those worlds will be
> "white noise" worlds, and making the choice that makes me right in the
> most worlds seems as rational as anything else.
> Though, if there is something significant riding on whether I choose
> correctly or not, then I have to decide what is most important to me:
> minimizing my suffering in the worlds where I'm wrong, or maximizing
> my gains in the worlds where I'm right.
> If there isn't significant suffering likely in the losing worlds, then
> I will be much more likely to base my decision on the observed or
> calculated probabilities, as Papineau suggests.
OK. It is not incompatible.
> BUT, if there is significant suffering likely in the worlds where I
> lose, I might very well focus making a choice that will minimize that
> suffering. In which case I will generally not base much of my
> decision on the "probabilities", since it is my view that all outcomes
> However, going a little further, this assumes that I only make one
> bet. As I mentioned before, I think that I will make all possible
Before the multiplication? I don't see how you could, here and
now, decide to do 2^(16180*10000*60*90*24) bets.
I am not asking your quantum or comp counterparts. The question is asked
to *the* Kelly to which I send this post.
> So, even if I make the "safe" suffering-minimizing bet in this
> branch, I know that in a closely related branch I will make the risky
> "gain-maximizing" bet and say to hell with the Kellys in the losing
You are hard with yourself, I mean with your selves ...
> So I know that even if I make the safe bet, there's another Kelly two
> worlds over making the risky bet, which will result in a Kelly
> suffering the consequences of losing over there anyway. So maybe I'll
> say, "screw it", and make the risky bet myself.
You could as well put your hand in the fire directly.
> Ultimately, it doesn't matter. Every Kelly in every situation with
> every history is actualized. So my subjective feeling that I am
> making choices is irrelevant. Every choice is going to get made, so
> my "choice" is really just me taking my place in the continuum of
First, in the multiplication experience, the question of your choice
is not addressed, nor needed.
The question is really: what will happen to you. You give the right
>> And I am asking you, here and now, what do you expect the most
>> probable experience you will feel tomorrow, when I will do that
> So to speak of expectations is to appeal to my "single world"
> intuitions. But we know that intuition isn't a reliable guide, since
> there are many aspects of reality that are unintuitive. So I think
> the fact that I have an intuitive expectation that things will happen
> a certain way, and only that way, is neither here nor there.
We can get counter-intuitive results only by starting with our
intuition, and we have to succeed in making those basic intuition very
solid, if we want to be able to make clear the counter-intuitive
consequences. If not, we can't progress at all, and we lose the
opportunity to abandon our wrong theories.
Common sense is the ONLY tool to go beyond common sense.
Have you understand UDA1-6?, because I think most get those steps. I
will soon explain in all details UDA-7, which is not entirely obvious.
If you take your own philosophy seriously, you don't need UDA8. But it
can be useful to convince others, of the necessity of that
"philosophy", once we bet on the comp hyp.
You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to email@example.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to
For more options, visit this group at