Thanks for the links. I'll look over them and hopefully I'll understand what I see. At least if I have questions I can ask though maybe not in this thread.
I don't yet know precisely what you mean by a machine but I do have superficial knowledge of Turing machines; I'm assuming there is a resemblance between the two concepts. I surmise that a machine can have an input like a question and if it halts then the question has a decidable answer, else it has no decidable answer. What about posing the following question "am I a machine" or the statement "I am a machine" and maybe some machines halt on an answer and some don't. Ie, if X is a machine, then have it attempt to compute the statement "X is a machine." (I know I'm a bit fuzzy on the details.) For machines X that return "X is a machine" I would be inclined to think such machines possess at least some form of self-awareness, a kind of abstract self-awareness devoid of sensation (or so it would appear). -Brian Bruno Marchal wrote: > On 02 Jun 2009, at 18:54, Brian Tenneson wrote: > > >> Thank you for starting this discussion. I have only joined recently >> and >> have little knowledge of your research. To see it laid out in the >> sequence you describe should make it clear to me what it is all about. >> >> I'm particularly interested in the interaction between consciousness >> and >> computation. In Max Tegmark's Ensemble TOE paper he alludes to a >> self-aware structure. I take structure to be an object of study in >> logic (model theory, in particular) but am not at all sure how >> consciousness, which I envision self-awareness to be deeply tied to, >> connects to mathematics. It seems you're going to build up to a >> statement such as "consciousness is computable" OR "consciousness is >> not >> computable," or something about consciousness, at least. >> > > > > In UDA, I avoid the use of consciousness. I just use the hypothesis > that consciousness, or first person experience remains unchanged for a > functional substitution made at the correct comp substitution level > (this is the comp hypothesis). > Then the UD Argument is supposed to show, that physicalism cannot be > maintained and that physics is a branch of computer science, or even > just number theory. > In AUDA, I refine the constructive feature of UDA to begin the > extraction of physics. > You can read my paper here, and print the UD slides, because I > currently refer often to the steps of that reasoning: > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/publications/SANE2004MARCHALAbstract.html > > I have written a better one, but I must still put it in my webapge. > > It seems to me that Tegmark is a bit fuzzy about the way he attaches > the first person experience with the "universes"/bodies. Like many > physicists, he is a bit naive about the mind-body problem. The > computationalist hypothesis is not a solution per se, just a tool > making it possible to reformulate the problem. Indeed it forces a > reduction of the mind-body problem to a highly non trivial body > problem. It is my whole point. > > UDA shows that if I am a machine then the universe, whatever it may > be, cannot be a machine. An apparent physical universe can, and > actually must emerge, from inside, but this one too cannot be entirely > described by a machine. > > > > > >> In light of that it seems a prudent fundamental step would be to >> define >> what it means for one structure to be aware of another. >> > > > > In AUDA, the arithmetical and more constructive version of UDA, > consciousness, like truth, will appear to be undefinable, except by > some fixed point of the doubting procedure. It is then show equivalent > to an instinctive bet on a reality. It has a relative self-speeding > role. > > > > > > >> This would >> apparently be some relation on the aggregate of all structures (which >> may be the entire level 4 multiverse in Tegmark's theory). Perhaps >> some >> basic fundamental step would be to provide some axioms on what this >> relation could be but I'm almost convinced this can't be done in a >> non-controversial way. >> > > > Computationalism is not controversal, nor is my deduction, but few > people get both the quantum difficulties and the mathematical logic. I > am more ignored than misunderstood, and then I don't publish so much. > But I love to explain to people with a genuine interest in those issues. > > > > >> I know I'm putting the cart before the horse here so I don't expect >> all >> to be revealed for some time when it occurs in your exposition. If >> there is some literature by yourself or others on the particular >> subjects and issues I mentioned, I'd appreciate links to them. >> > > > Almost all my papers dig on that issue. See my url > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > or search in this list for explanations. What is new, and > counterintuitive is that computationalism entails a reversal between > physics and machine's biology/psychology/theology .... See my paper on > Plotinus for a presentation of AUDA in term of Plotinus (neo)platonist > theology. > > We cannot define consciousness (nor the notion of natural numbers), > but we don't have to define those things to reason about, once we > agree on some principles (like the "yes doctor" and Church thesis). > > Welcome aboard on the train Brian, > > Bruno > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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