Hi Kim, RITSIAR means real in the sense that I am real.
Cheers Brian Kim Jones wrote: > Could somebody kindly tell me/explain to me what "RITSIAR" means? I > cannot find any explanation of this in the threads which mention it. > > Sorry to be dumb, > > Kim > > > On 27/07/2009, at 12:52 AM, David Nyman wrote: > > >> Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and >> machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your >> helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis of >> my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I >> hope this will be helpful for future discussion. >> >> THE APHORISMS >> >> We do not see the mind, we see *through* the mind. >> >> What we see through the mind - its contents - is mind-stuff: dreams. >> >> Hence dream content - i.e. whatever is capable of being present to us >> - can't be our ontology - this would be circular (the eye can't see >> itself). >> >> So the brain (i.e. what the eye can see) can't be the mind; but the >> intuition remains that mind and brain might be correlated by some >> inclusive conception that would constitute our ontology: Kant's great >> insight stands. >> >> It is similarly obvious that 'identity' theories and the like are >> non-sense: it would indeed be hard to think of two descriptions less >> 'identical' than brain-descriptions and mind-descriptions: hence >> again, any such identification could only be via some singular >> correlative synthesis. >> >> Hence any claim that the mind is literally identical with, or >> 'inside', the brain can be shown to be false by the simple - if messy >> - expedient of a scalpel; or else can be unmasked as implicitly >> dualistic: i.e. the claim is really that 'inside' and 'outside' are >> not merely different descriptions, but different ontologies. >> >> By extension of our individual introspecting, a plurality of minds, >> and the 'external world' that includes brains, can be conceived as >> correlated in some way - to be elucidated - in a universal synthesis >> or context: that context being our mutual ontology. >> >> Such a universal context, or in common terms 'what exists', cannot be >> fully known (i.e. can't be exhausted by description) although - or >> rather because - it constitutes what we are, and by extension what >> *everything* is. >> >> Nonetheless we may seek a logic of dreaming so far as it goes, and >> this will indeed be as far as anything goes in the way of knowledge >> claims. >> >> Mathematics may be deployed as a dream-logic: but mathematical >> physics, restricted to 'physical heuristics', prototypically gets >> stuck at the level of describing the content and behaviour of dreams, >> not their genesis. >> >> To go further and deeper we need an explicit mathematical >> specification of dreamers and their dreams, and of generative >> mechanisms by which dreamers and their dream contents can be >> constructed. >> >> Such a schema will by its nature form an analysis of how we come to >> believe that we and our world are real, and in what terms: i.e. how we >> come to know a world in a present and personal manner. >> >> Consequently such a schema must subsume within its universe of >> discourse: being, knowing, perceiving, acting and intending - as the >> foundations of what it means to be real: i.e. it must be capable of >> invoking the Cheshire Cat *to the life*, not merely leave its grin >> hanging in the void. >> >> Moving beyond bare analysis and description, any move to universalise >> and 'realise' the axioms of such a schema is to make a claim on >> ontological finality. It has not been completely clear (to me) >> whether COMP necessarily makes such a stipulation on realisation, in >> the sense of a claim that its axioms *literally are* what is present >> and personal (i.e. RITSIAR). >> >> However I'm coming to suspect that it does not in fact make such a >> claim, although it allows any one of us to take this as a personal >> leap of faith, specifically through the acid test of saying yes to the >> doctor. >> >> COMP may turn out to be false in its specific predictions - i.e. >> empirical tests >> could rule out the possibility of our being finite machines; or >> perhaps we can never be sure one way or the other. >> >> Nonetheless, the inescapable implication is that any alternative >> schema must from the outset explicitly and fearlessly address the same >> problem space or else run foul of the same intractable 0-1-3 person >> ontological and epistemological issues. >> >> This has profound implications for virtually all current cosmological >> TOEs: i.e. a view from nowhere turns out to be nobody's view. As has >> been observed in other writings, our understanding remains profoundly >> obscured and distorted unless we restore the personal to the view from >> nowhere. Only then can we conceive why indeed there is somewhere >> rather than nowhere. >> >> > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---