2009/7/31 Bruno Marchal <[email protected]>: > Hmm... It is a bit like David, you put to much emphasis, to say the > least, on the first person, which is the subject of consciousness.
I'm not sure you fully grasp my position on this yet - we're still struggling to an extent with semantics. And of course, your perspective is informed always by COMP - quite rightly, it's your metier - but my position, though sympathetic to yours, isn't necessarily identical. Further clarification will probably have to be postponed till my return from Bonny Scotland. > The ONE is "just" arithmetical truth. But I am not sanguine about > this, analytical truth works the same. > The INTELLECT is "arithmetical provability" > The KNOWER (alias the first person, alias the universal soul) is > provability in case of truth. > INTELLIGIBLE MATTER is "arithmetical provability in case of > arithmetical consistency". > SENSIBLE MATTER is "arithmetical provability in case of arithmetical > consistency and truth". Very interesting. More on all this at some point, please. >> Well, of course it's solipsistic, but that's its strength. > > ? The 'solipsism of the One', which we've discussed before. You can only 'know' in the context of the system in which you participate. >> You can >> only know yourself: but that 'self', properly understood, extends >> beyond merely perspectival horizons, to everything that is. > > You are a billion times too much quick here. This is an example of the semantic problem to which I refer. But I've never really understood whether 0-personal in your sense means not-personal or personal-to-the-minimum-but-not-vanishing-degree. >> This is what my mother used to call 'having the courage of your lack >> of convictions'. I like it. > > I am not sure I understand that remark. Alas, we can no longer ask her what she meant. David > > I comment on Rex's post, as quoted by David, and then I comment > David's post. > On 30 Jul 2009, at 22:34, David Nyman wrote: > >> >> 2009/7/30 Rex Allen <[email protected]>: >> >>> It seems to me that the primary meaning of "to exist" is "to be >>> conscious". > > > Hmm.. I do not completely disagree, because I can prove (with the AUDA > definition of belief and knowledge, that what Rex says is indeed true, > from the first person point of view. But taking this 100% seriously > leads to solipism. If only to pursue this discussion I bet on the > existence of some others, which consciousness I am currently > disconnected from (thankfully, the net provides a way to share third > person little pieces of things between us to supply that non first > person apparent sharing). >>> >>> >>> But what causes conscious experience? Well, I'm beginning to think >>> that nothing causes it. > > OK. I rather clearly disagree. Arithmetical relations "cause" it. They > are clearly responsible for numbers introspection and numbers > chatting, and their discovery of the gap between. > > > >>> Our conscious experience is fundamental, >>> uncaused, and irreducible. > > > Uncaused, OK, like any property of number can be said to be uncaused. > > >>> >>> >>> Why do we think that our conscious experience must be caused? Maybe >>> this isn't a valid assumption. Maybe we are being led astray by the >>> apparent nature of the macroscopic material world that we perceive? > > > Well, we search not necessarily a cause, but still an explanation. And > that explanation has to fit with what we can prove, can know, can > feel, can observe, and can infer. > > To say consciousness is fundamental does not explain many thing. It is > a bit like saying matter is fundamental, except that in this case it > is helped in some methodological way for some time. > > >>> >>> >>> So on the surface this view of consciousness as fundamental may sound >>> a bit off-putting, > > And as, you seem to be aware, it leads to solipsism. > > >>> but I think it's not so radical compared to >>> competing theories. > > Hmm... It is a bit like David, you put to much emphasis, to say the > least, on the first person, which is the subject of consciousness. > Comp saves the first person from its materialistic elimination, but > comp does not eliminate mathematics, nor physics. It provides a very > precise theory which supplies the absence of matter and explain its > appearance, and which I like to call "machine or number theology", if > only because it provides a clean purely arithmetical interpretation > (AUDA) of Plotinus neoplatonist theory. > > The ONE is "just" arithmetical truth. But I am not sanguine about > this, analytical truth works the same. > The INTELLECT is "arithmetical provability" > The KNOWER (alias the first person, alias the universal soul) is > provability in case of truth. > INTELLIGIBLE MATTER is "arithmetical provability in case of > arithmetical consistency". > SENSIBLE MATTER is "arithmetical provability in case of arithmetical > consistency and truth". > > This makes 8 (meta)theories, which capture the same part of > arithmetic, but have quite different modal logics, which correspond to > different types of point of view. 8 because three of them are split > into provable and unprovable parts by the incompleteness phenomena. > > To put it roughly: consciousness is a Goddess, sure, but it has seven > Sisters. > If we follow Plotinus, those correspond to the degree of "falling" of > the soul. > > >>> David answered: >> >> Of course I'm in sympathy with what you say here. > > I am not astonished :) > > > > >> I've recently been >> picking the bones out of 'Panpsychism in the West' by David Skrbina >> which is a pretty comprehensive review of the surprisingly large >> number of thinkers who've actually held - or hold - some version of >> this view; and that's just in the West. >> >> However, I actually think we can do better than this. The extraneous >> baggage attaching to 'mental' vocabulary really gets in the way of >> clarity if we attempt to phrase it as you have. It's open to anyone >> reading what you say above to accept or reject based on the contents >> of *their* 'consciousness portmanteau'. But perhaps we don't have to >> go this far: maybe we can say something more restricted which >> surprisingly turns out to be more radical. Without repeating the >> whole analysis here, my view is that the heart of the matter lies in a >> rigorous redefinition of the semantics of 'exist' and its cognates. >> >> These different senses get chucked about in such a variety of >> ontological and epistemological guises that one is often at a loss to >> know what any particular use is attempting to pick out in the world. >> So my point is simply: let's start from the understanding that to >> exist is just and only what it is to exist-for-oneself: the defining >> characteristic of existence is 'taking everything personally'. The >> standard put-down at this point is something like 'well how personally >> do you suppose an electron takes itself?' to which the riposte is >> simply 'precisely as personally as it needs to exist'. >> >> Of course one might also ask 'how materially do you suppose an >> electron take itself?' and answer 'precisely as materially as it needs >> to exist'. But in granting a 'material' ontology to ourselves and the >> electron, we are immediately at a loss for somewhere to locate the >> personal unless we add a second ontological category for it to >> inhabit: and then any hope we might have a workable notion of >> interaction is irretrievably dashed. >> >> So now you may legitimately enquire: fair enough, but how do we get >> consciousness out of 'taking everything personally?' Well, it depends >> what you mean by..... But no, it does - really. This is already the >> 'easy problem' (tee hee) in that once you see that you're at large in >> a context that takes everything personally - but no more than it takes >> to exist-for-itself - you can work on your theories of 'consciousness' >> with some expectation that somebody will be there to take it >> personally when those great thoughts and feelings emerge. It's a bit >> like (in fact exactly like) the way we construct 'material' models in >> the confident expectation that NOBODY will be there to take it >> personally when all those great 'processes' and 'structures' emerge. >> But now we can see - as you point out below - that these 'material' >> entities can really only be elements of our personal >> existence-for-ourselves. Sure, we believe they refer to something >> beyond their representational role, but that something else is taking >> things personally in another part of the forest. And if they do not >> thus refer? Well, then they're just zombies. > > OK. With some reserves. > > >> Rex: >> >>> Take the brain. I haven't verified it myself, but I'm willing to >>> believe that the structure and function of the brain is closely >>> correlated with the mind. My brain represents the contents of my >>> conscious experience. The activity of the brain over time maps to the >>> the contents of my conscious experience over time. Fine. > > OK. > > >>> But the brain >>> is not the cause of my conscious experience. > > OK. But is an evidence of having a deep and long computational > history. And in a sense, the brain is the "cause" of my consciousness > "filtration" in a vast subset of future computational histories. > > >>> A brain is something that >>> one is conscious OF, and thus has a secondary, derivative type of >>> existence. > > OK. > > >>> David: >> >> Very well put. I've mentioned David Bohm's model of a video game, >> which actually got him thinking about the relationships inherent in >> the above scenario, thus: there's a game taking place on a screen >> (explicate order) being acted on by (but not itself acting on) a >> program (implicate order), which in turn is being acted on by (but not >> acting on) the feedback from a player (super-implicate order). In >> this analogy, the brain-body-world is akin to the on-screen >> representation, which in fact emerges from, and is under the control >> of, an underlying set of orderings that seamlessly incorporate both >> player and game. Subject and object then emerge as a heuristic >> distinction in the guise of complementary poles abstracted from >> feedback relationships. > > I will have to reread that. > > >> Rex: >> >>> I can think about my brain, so it is something that I am conscious >>> of, >>> and so it exists in that sense. To the extent that I can examine and >>> experiment on someone else's brain, that is also a perceived >>> experience. But again, all of these things could happen in a dream, >>> or >>> hallucination, or to a brain-in-a-vat, or to someone in a computer >>> simulation. >> >> Yes, it could, but this may not be the version most conducive to >> sanity! >> >>> But the brain >>> is not the cause of my conscious experience. A brain is something >>> that >>> one is conscious OF, and thus has a secondary, derivative type of >>> existence. >> >> Yes, and this 'secondary' existence is just a category of >> existence-for-oneself. > > Here you talk about the 'brain' which is in your 'brain'. the physical > brain is most plausibility a completely definable "object". Its > physics, as we can observe it, relies eventually on infinite histories. > > > >> The contents of consciousness are precisely >> what we are taking personally, else they couldn't exist for us. We >> co-habit with them. But they don't just sit there: they connect >> seamlessly beyond our personal horizons, which is how we get to >> justify the belief that they refer to something - as we tend to say - >> outside our selves. But that 'outside' of course isn't outside at >> all; it's just as 'inside' as we are, taking things just as personally >> as it needs to exist, just like us. The external world we see so >> clearly is a reflection of the inside-out surfaces of our mindworlds. > > OUR, the Löbian machines. OK. > OUR, the Humans. Not OK. > > >> >> >>> Similarly, science. I'm willing to believe that quantum mechanics and >>> relativity both describe my observations very well. But this is just >>> the fitting of various mathematical formulas and narratives to what >>> we >>> are conscious of. There's no deeper meaning to science than that. It >>> doesn't tell us about what fundamentally exists. > > I recall that theology has been keep out of science and academies > since 1500 years, and has still not really come back. > Due to this unfortunate situation, "science" is confused as being a > sort of theology by itself, which it cannot be. > The least I have try to do is to illustrate that we can reason and > proceed "scientifically" (= proposing modest refutable theories on > consciousness, souls, person, identity and various "god- > like"mathematical and non mathematical entities). > Science is half-blind since a long time, but it is not the fault of > the science spirit, it is the fault of the human spirit which abuse of > the ten thousand authority arguments around those fundamental > questions, and, as consequence, that the spirit of science is > forbidden there. > > >>> It provides us with >>> stories that fit what our experiences: "IF you were made from >>> subatomic particles in a physical universe, THIS system of particles >>> and forces is consistent with your current observations." > > Science will never provide more than IF this then THAT. Even theology. > To defend theology as a science consists in admitting to propose > theory (IF this), and then derive consequences in that theory (then > THAT). And test it, directly, indirectly up to the refutation, and > amelioration, correction, publication, etc. > > >>> >> >> Yes, and of course WERE you thus made you wouldn't find anybody there >> to take things personally. The great value of COMP, I think, is that >> it pumps the intuition that we can't take persons for granted: they >> don't just map directly onto our representations, which I guess we >> should have expected, because god knows they don't look like anything >> that could be us. Of course a computational narrative may turn out >> not to be the way to go, but I strongly suspect that we still await a >> revolution in - well not physics, but..what? being-science? (gawd) - >> that will be in a primary sense generative of persons prior to the >> generation of appearances. > > The theology of numbers. What they can feel and dream, about > themselves and each others, relatively to each one. > > > >> IOW, there probably has to be some sort of >> fundamentally implicate-explicate-superexplicate thingamijig going on >> out there - er, I mean in here. > > Sure. > > >> >> >>> Science is basically us trying to make sense of a dream. >>> >>> So in this view, consciousness is very simple. What's complicated is >>> fitting "explanatory" scientific theories to what is observed, and >>> identifying and understanding causal structures (e.g., a brain, a >>> machine, whatever) whose evolving state can be interpreted as >>> representing a series of "connected" or "related" instances of >>> consciousness. > > Numbers do that. > > > >>> But the observed physical system is NOT conscious, it >>> just represents the contents of someone's conscious experience. >> >> Very well put. >> >>> So initially this view seems somewhat...solipsistic (?), > > > Not necessarily, yet. You could have talk about "universal > consciousness", which does make sense with comp, although I am not > entirely sure. Universal consciousness is the consciousness of the > virgin universal machine, which is rare to find those days (when you > buy a computer it is already full of non universal programs). A > particular consciousness is when the universal consciousness forget > its origin. But this, to be sure, has not yet been asked to the > universal machine (it is beyond AUDA, I mean). > > > >>> but >>> ultimately I think it really isn't much more radical than any other >>> theory on the table. For instance, any deterministic scientific >>> theory >>> entails that we have the experience of making choices without making >>> actual choices (in the free will sense). And so does any >>> indeterminstic theory that is based on bottom-up causation. >> >> Well, of course it's solipsistic, but that's its strength. > > ? > > > >> You can >> only know yourself: but that 'self', properly understood, extends >> beyond merely perspectival horizons, to everything that is. > > You are a billion times too much quick here. > > > > >> This is >> the perennial philosophy, and in this case, perennial because >> unavoidable. > > OK. > > > >> And as for 'deterministic', if we want to deploy >> causation in our narratives - and I don't see why we shouldn't - then >> existence-for-self gives you a conveniently monistically-collapsed >> version of the causal nexus that indivisibly unites perception, >> intention and action. Since they're indivisible, they only work in >> concert, and hence you can't get causal closure until the sense >> necessary in context gains expression. As to 'first' causes, I think >> we've reached the end of the semantic road. > > I disagree. For any rational people betting their brain is a machine, > addition and multiplication are very good first cause. Equivalent one > are abstraction and application. There are many other equivalent one, > for the theology. They are not equivalent with respect to engineering, > though. > > > >> If you want, you can can >> elect to be a mathematical Prospero and conjure us from the deep by >> tautological force majeure, or you can accept the mystery of our >> contingent 'necessity'. Take your pick. >> >>> Beyond that, all theories eventually boil down to having to having to >>> take some set of fundamental entities and laws as unexplained, >>> unsupported brute facts. So whether it's one level down or twelve >>> levels down, at some point they end up saying "and these things just >>> exist, created from nothing, supported by nothing". > > Yes, that's right. But some theories are elegant, does not eliminate > person, are more fun, than others. > > >>> >>> >>> So, no matter which way we go, reality doesn't match our common-sense >>> expectations. > > > Right, but common-sense change all the time. Somehow, it is a provable > promise that it never really stabilize, unless it remember its origin. > In that case it can perhaps contemplate the big thing, but can no more > play in it. (Again I am beyond AUDA). > > > >>> I think this view makes the fewest assumptions, and >>> ultimately seems no more fantastical than any other theory on offer >> >> This is what my mother used to call 'having the courage of your lack >> of convictions'. I like it. > > I am not sure I understand that remark. To sum up you have the > > current paradigm: > > MATTER => CONSCIOUSNESS => NUMBER > > comp forces the reversal: > > NUMBER => CONSCIOUSNESS => MATTER (followed by => HUMAN > CONSCIOUSNESS => HUMAN NUMBER) > > Rex proposes something like: > > CONSCIOUSNESS => ? > > It is radical, and it is difficult to say if it explains anything. I > suspect the goal could be personal enlightnment instead of a search in > a communicable theory which should or could explain the observable and > non observable (but "feelable", like pain) phenomena. > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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