2009/7/30 John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com>: Hi John
Well, I'm equally moved that you have the motivation and interest to read what I write! I'm uncomfortably aware that I often dump quite a lump of verbiage at once, so do let me know whenever anything is obscure. There's a narrow path between saying too much and too little that's hard to tread. But essentially, I'm just proposing a context in which you or I or anyone might think about just the kind of deeper questions you pose, to see if they might possibly appear any less paradoxical this way - or at least, to situate the remaining paradoxes less discomfitingly! All I would ever ask - and of course this works both ways - is your willingness to climb inside my model with an attitude of "hmm.. what if?", take a look around from that perspective, interrogate it by rethinking your queries in terms of it, if that's possible, and then climb out again - none the worse, I trust, for the experiment. Beyond this, only more questions, but with luck perhaps a little differently shaped. I'm off to Scotland at the weekend for a few days of hiking (taking my Goretex!) so I probably won't be present much on the list during that period, but I'll take a glance if I get an opportunity (i.e. if Mrs N lets me anywhere near a computer). David > Hi, David, > I am deeply moved that you spent so close a look at my questions - taking > them seriously enough to reply in length and kind. I will re-re-reread your > posts (more than just to me) and try to arrive at some readable response in > 3 - 30 days<G> if I can. > I don't promise to oppose, maybe in the contrary. > > For now: > as I get older I detect more and more to be confused about. I find a > generalization potential in terms used even today (I am weary of the great > thinkers of the past, who looked at things in a reasonably smaller cognitive > inventory and so could apply their extraordinary logic more freely (- > unbiased by many 'facts') we think about today.) > I think about 'information' as "sensed correlation of relations" - > mixing in with 'consciousness', 'life', 'knowledge', even > - with 'observation', all these terms riding in similar carriages. Any > more specific term runs into inadequacies I cannot handle. > I appreciate your 'image' of a wave requiring 'stuff' that may undulate. > > I think you disregarded my Q# >2. (what keeps it running?) and concentrated > only of birth and death. Maybe there is NO 'run' in between, indeed? > relations occur and disappear, in a preferred timeless view the 'process' or > 'action' is our figment. Remember: I am fundamentally naive (by > conventional, i.e. reductionistic natural science studies). But I try.... > > Existence is a hard term, I accept it upon something YOU just think about: > it 'exists' in your mind (whatever we assign to that). > > Self? (May I refer to the ONE and only Koan in Oriental Science I ever heard > about: the one handed clapping.) I made a second one? (just for the fun of > it): the "SELF" which is a relation of ONE to itself. I don'tgo for > "reflexive": that requires and observer and so we just have met Mr > Homunculus. > > I hope to return to this post with smarter reflections some time. > > John Mikes > > > On Wed, Jul 29, 2009 at 11:52 AM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: >> >> 2009/7/28 John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com>: >> >> Hi John >> >> > I really do not expect from you to give adequate replies to all these >> > questions - it would make the grandkids of our grandkits scientifically >> > unemployed but you have unusual solutions and ideas and it may be >> > interesting to tape your mind.. >> >> Whew! But you are right about my inadequacies. Indeed I see my basic >> task, as others before me, to witheringly expose the specific >> inadequacies of my replies to any and all questions. To know less and >> less with ever greater clarity is the journey and precisely-delineated >> ignorance is the ultimate goal. In that spirit...... >> >> > "Mind is what brain does" (although I find it a pars pro toto) >> > I am questioning "does". Would we restrict it to our ongoing image of >> > physiology, meaning: the brain does physical 'energy' consuming >> > electrical >> > changes by (physico/chemical) impact and by physiological changes (such >> > as >> > diffeences in blood-stream performance, chemical syntheses and migration >> > of >> > molecules) - or do we assign activities of some brain-image beyond >> > today's >> > anatomical biology? >> >> I'm pretty convinced that we're going to be stymied in much of this >> until we find another schema in which to re-express a new set of >> 'ultimates' for the purpose. You've seen the various ways I've tried >> to pump people's intuitions about this, but it may be that how one >> feels about it is ultimately characterologically influenced rather >> than logically compulsive. However, I believe that we need a new >> picture and a different language before the >> physical-chemical-biological story you refer to above, and the >> experiential, intentional narrative that we ignore at the cost of our >> minds, can ever be reconciled satisfactorily. On this basis, my >> interest in COMP is not because I know it to be correct, but rather >> that it is the beginning of an attempt to recast the investigation in >> these terms, which is VERY hard to discover elsewhere. In this regard >> I should again note that Colin is working on his own approach on a >> different basis but very much in the same spirit. >> >> > 1. What instigates the 'function' (called mindwork) - ostentibly with >> > connection to our 'material-figment' BRAIN, >> >> In my various ramblings, I've tried to cut the whole Gordian knot of >> what can coherently be said to exist, and within this the whole debate >> on materialism, panpsychism, mind-body hard problems, causal closure >> of the physical, etc. by a simple expediency which then struck me as >> obviously true (how about that?). To re-state: >> >> 1) Is there some logically prior requirement for anything to be said >> to exist? Reflect: 'something existing' necessitates presence not >> absence. >> 2) What is the relation between presence and "I"' as I discover >> myself? Reflect: "I" discover myself to be present. >> 3) Conjunction of 1) and 2): There is presence and it is reflexive. >> This constitutes what can be said to exist, and discovers it to be >> personal (i.e. there is an "I" associated with it). >> 4) Is there some logically prior requirement to my 'knowing' anything? >> Reflect: this and that must be distinguishable. In terms of the >> foregoing, this necessitates reflexive encounter (i.e. >> self-differentiation) This necessarily unites the senses of >> 'perceive', 'intend' and 'act'. >> 5) Conjunction of 1) - 4) "I" discover myself to be present through >> reflexive encounter. I've called this 'getting-a-grip-on-Oneself. >> This move now collapses being, knowing, perceiving, intending and >> acting. >> >> That's it. But now we have all the prerequisites for not only >> mindwork, but also matter-energy work, by this (as it seems to me) >> simple recognition of a present and differentiable personal synthesis. >> More: this very recognition now seems (to me at least) to be the >> logically compelling prerequisite for any meaningful sense of >> existence whatsoever. From this simplicity, by differentiation we can >> achieve mental and material multiplicity without limit, sans any >> crazy-making ontological separation of mind and body. The hard part >> is the specifics of the correlation. >> >> > 2. What keeps it running (and please, save me from the marvel of >> > physicists >> > the call 'energy' - but nobody knows what it is) >> > 3. Who tells the process to buzz off, it is done, >> >> Well, it will appear, disappear, and reappear as the manifestation of >> patterns of self-encounter. Fundamentally, these patterns are not to >> be distinguished into mind or matter, and this is crucial from the >> necessary though limited perspective of causation, because it makes an >> indivisible unity of perception, intention, and action central to the >> logic of the story. Nonetheless it will be a requirement of local >> narratives in the 'traditions' either of physiology or phenomenology >> to deploy the appropriate metaphors plausibly and to give intuitively >> graspable answers to your the questions. >> >> > 4. How does the 'product' incorporate into the rest of it? >> > (BTW these questions arise in 'functions','reactions',processes as well, >> > if >> > we think beyond Physix Textbook 101). >> >> Ah, the product is of course yet another aspect of being/knowing. >> IOW, we exist as mini-mes within perspectival horizons that limit us >> to mindworlds that nonetheless continue seamlessly in relation beyond >> those horizons. The mindworld by the arguments presented above >> constitutes both our being and our knowledge. There is not (cannot >> logically be) any observer and hence (unfortunately for Copenhagen >> interpretations) no observation. Reflect on the neonate: no >> differentiation of self and other has yet occurred. But through a >> sort of inferred video game system of feedback, the "I" polarises to a >> complementary subjective pole, forcing the rest of the mindworld to >> the objective 'externalised' extreme, wherein characterisations of >> 'functions', 'reactions', 'processes' in terms of causality are >> distinctively 'active' rather than 'intentional'. Hence you may see >> how all reality and all delusion stem from this survival reaction. >> >> > 5. Is a "thought" a product of the mind-process? if so, where does it >> > settle >> > to become consciously acknowledged for us... (for WHOM???) >> >> Well, I pursue my line of argument, and from this perspective thought >> is a distinguishable modality of our mindworld - IOW a distinguishable >> aspect at once of our being and our knowing. And for whom? Well, >> I've been badgering Bruno on this very topic more than somewhat, but >> again my line is that the 'whom' is the reflexively present global "I" >> derived above, limited to mini-mes by perspectival horizons and pushed >> to a subjective pole by the inexorable requirements of a >> biological/evolutionary narrative. You're entitled to claim on this >> basis, as mini-me at any rate, that you are merely the master of all >> you survey, but that couldn't be the case if in fact you weren't at >> the same time heir to the whole ball of wax. >> >> David >> >> > David, >> > this question of mine is not within the ongoing discussion-details, just >> > 'about' the ideas exposed in them. >> > >> > "Mind is what brain does" (although I find it a pars pro toto) >> > I am questioning "does". Would we restrict it to our ongoing image of >> > physiology, meaning: the brain does physical 'energy' consuming >> > electrical >> > changes by (physico/chemical) impact and by physiological changes (such >> > as >> > diffeences in blood-stream performance, chemical syntheses and migration >> > of >> > molecules) - or do we assign activities of some brain-image beyond >> > today's >> > anatomical biology? >> > In the first case 'mind' is physical, memory, thought, mentality is as >> > of >> > yesterday and we can stop perspective research. Slowly return to >> > faithful >> > creationism. >> > If we believe in further enrichment of our cognitive inventory, I >> > question: >> > 1. What instigates the 'function' (called mindwork) - ostentibly with >> > connection to our 'material-figment' BRAIN, >> > 2. What keeps it running (and please, save me from the marvel of >> > physicists >> > the call 'energy' - but nobody knows what it is) >> > 3. Who tells the process to buzz off, it is done, and >> > 4. How does the 'product' incorporate into the rest of it? >> > (BTW these questions arise in 'functions','reactions',processes as well, >> > if >> > we think beyond Physix Textbook 101). >> > 5. Is a "thought" a product of the mind-process? if so, where does it >> > settle >> > to become consciously acknowledged for us... (for WHOM???) >> > >> > I really do not expect from you to give adequate replies to all these >> > questions - it would make the grandkids of our grandkits scientifically >> > unemployed but you have unusual solutions and ideas and it may be >> > interesting to tape your mind... >> > >> > You mentioned below the 'mind-body' problem. Considering 'body' as part >> > of >> > the figment of the 'physical world' and 'mind' something more than just >> > that, I see an old artifax of a problem, how to save obsolescence into >> > advancement. >> > I am not ready to go into that. >> > >> > John Mikes >> > >> > >> > >> > >> > On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 7:34 PM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> >> > wrote: >> >> >> >> 2009/7/27 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> >> >> >> >> > That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone >> >> > claim that >> >> > the mind is the brain. The materialist claim is that the mind is >> >> > what >> >> > the >> >> > brain does, i.e. the mind is a process. That's implicit in COMP, the >> >> > idea that >> >> > functionally identical units can substituted for parts of your brain >> >> > without any >> >> > untoward effects. >> >> >> >> Yes indeed. But what do we mean by a process in materialist ontology? >> >> To speak of what the brain 'does' is to refer to actual changes of >> >> state of physical elements - at whatever arbitrary level you care to >> >> define them - of the material object in question. So now you have two >> >> options: either the 'process' is just an added-on description of these >> >> material changes of state, and hence redundant or imaginary in any >> >> ontological sense, or else you are implicitly claiming a second - >> >> non-material - ontological status for the mind-process so invoked. As >> >> I said, it would be difficult to imagine two states of being more >> >> different than minds and brains (i.e. this is the classic mind-body >> >> dilemma). >> >> >> >> This is the insight in Bruno's requirement of the COMP reversal of >> >> physics and mind as described in step 8 of his SANE2004 paper. It's >> >> aim is to deal a knockdown blow to any facile intuition of the mind as >> >> the computation (i.e. process) of a material brain, and IMO the >> >> argument more than merits a direct riposte in that light. >> >> Furthermore, in a platonic COMP, the question of the level of >> >> substitution required to reproduce your mind is unprovable, and has to >> >> be an act of faith in any 'doctor' who claims to know. >> >> >> >> AFAICS, until these 'under-the-carpet' issues are squarely faced, the >> >> customary waving away of the brain-mind relation as a simplistic >> >> functional identity remains pure materialist prejudice, and on the >> >> basis of the above, flatly erroneous. To say the least, any such >> >> relation is moot, absent a radically deeper insight into the mind-body >> >> problem. >> >> >> >> David >> >> >> >> > >> >> > Bruno Marchal wrote: >> >> > > >> >> > > On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote: >> >> > > >> >> > >> Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and >> >> > >> machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your >> >> > >> helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis >> >> > >> of >> >> > >> my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I >> >> > >> hope this will be helpful for future discussion. >> >> > >> >> >> > >> THE APHORISMS >> >> > >> >> >> > >> We do not see the mind, we see *through* the mind. >> >> > >> >> >> > >> What we see through the mind - its contents - is mind-stuff: >> >> > >> dreams. >> >> > >> >> >> > >> Hence dream content - i.e. whatever is capable of being present to >> >> > >> us >> >> > >> - can't be our ontology - this would be circular (the eye can't >> >> > >> see >> >> > >> itself). >> >> > >> >> >> > >> So the brain (i.e. what the eye can see) can't be the mind; but >> >> > >> the >> >> > >> intuition remains that mind and brain might be correlated by some >> >> > >> inclusive conception that would constitute our ontology: Kant's >> >> > >> great >> >> > >> insight stands. >> >> > >> >> > It's more than an intuition. There's lots of evidence the mind and >> >> > brain are >> >> > correlated: from getting drunk, concusions, neurosurgery, mrfi,... >> >> > >> >> > >> >> >> > >> It is similarly obvious that 'identity' theories and the like are >> >> > >> non-sense: it would indeed be hard to think of two descriptions >> >> > >> less >> >> > >> 'identical' than brain-descriptions and mind-descriptions: hence >> >> > >> again, any such identification could only be via some singular >> >> > >> correlative synthesis. >> >> > >> >> >> > >> Hence any claim that the mind is literally identical with, or >> >> > >> 'inside', the brain can be shown to be false by the simple - if >> >> > >> messy >> >> > >> - expedient of a scalpel; or else can be unmasked as implicitly >> >> > >> dualistic: i.e. the claim is really that 'inside' and 'outside' >> >> > >> are >> >> > >> not merely different descriptions, but different ontologies. >> >> > >> >> > That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone >> >> > claim that >> >> > the mind is the brain. The materialist claim is that the mind is >> >> > what >> >> > the >> >> > brain does, i.e. the mind is a process. That's implicit in COMP, the >> >> > idea that >> >> > functionally identical units can substituted for parts of your brain >> >> > without any >> >> > untoward effects. >> >> > >> >> > Brent >> >> > >> >> > >> >> > > >> >> >> >> > >> >> > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---