Hi, David, I am deeply moved that you spent so close a look at my questions - taking them seriously enough to reply in length and kind. I will re-re-reread your posts (more than just to me) and try to arrive at some readable response in 3 - 30 days<G> if I can. I don't promise to oppose, maybe in the contrary.
For now: as I get older I detect more and more to be confused about. I find a * generalization* potential in terms used even today (I am weary of the great thinkers of the past, who looked at things in a reasonably smaller cognitive inventory and so could apply their extraordinary logic more freely (- unbiased by many 'facts') we think about today.) I think about *'information'* as *"sensed correlation of relations"* - mixing in with 'consciousness', 'life', 'knowledge', even - with 'observation', all these terms riding in similar carriages. Any more specific term runs into inadequacies I cannot handle. I appreciate your 'image' of a wave requiring 'stuff' that may undulate. I think you disregarded my Q# >2. (what keeps it running?) and concentrated only of birth and death. Maybe there is NO 'run' in between, indeed? relations occur and disappear, in a preferred timeless view the 'process' or 'action' is our figment. Remember: I am fundamentally naive (by conventional, i.e. reductionistic natural science studies). But I try.... Existence is a hard term, I accept it upon something YOU just think about: it 'exists' in your mind (whatever we assign to that). Self? (May I refer to the ONE and only Koan in Oriental Science I ever heard about: the one handed clapping.) I made a second one? (just for the fun of it): the *"SELF"* which is a relation of ONE to itself. I don'tgo for "reflexive": that requires and observer and so we just have met Mr Homunculus. I hope to return to this post with smarter reflections some time. John Mikes On Wed, Jul 29, 2009 at 11:52 AM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> wrote: > > 2009/7/28 John Mikes <jami...@gmail.com>: > > Hi John > > > I really do not expect from you to give adequate replies to all these > > questions - it would make the grandkids of our grandkits scientifically > > unemployed but you have unusual solutions and ideas and it may be > > interesting to tape your mind.. > > Whew! But you are right about my inadequacies. Indeed I see my basic > task, as others before me, to witheringly expose the specific > inadequacies of my replies to any and all questions. To know less and > less with ever greater clarity is the journey and precisely-delineated > ignorance is the ultimate goal. In that spirit...... > > > "Mind is what brain does" (although I find it a pars pro toto) > > I am questioning "does". Would we restrict it to our ongoing image of > > physiology, meaning: the brain does physical 'energy' consuming > electrical > > changes by (physico/chemical) impact and by physiological changes (such > as > > diffeences in blood-stream performance, chemical syntheses and migration > of > > molecules) - or do we assign activities of some brain-image beyond > today's > > anatomical biology? > > I'm pretty convinced that we're going to be stymied in much of this > until we find another schema in which to re-express a new set of > 'ultimates' for the purpose. You've seen the various ways I've tried > to pump people's intuitions about this, but it may be that how one > feels about it is ultimately characterologically influenced rather > than logically compulsive. However, I believe that we need a new > picture and a different language before the > physical-chemical-biological story you refer to above, and the > experiential, intentional narrative that we ignore at the cost of our > minds, can ever be reconciled satisfactorily. On this basis, my > interest in COMP is not because I know it to be correct, but rather > that it is the beginning of an attempt to recast the investigation in > these terms, which is VERY hard to discover elsewhere. In this regard > I should again note that Colin is working on his own approach on a > different basis but very much in the same spirit. > > > 1. What instigates the 'function' (called mindwork) - ostentibly with > > connection to our 'material-figment' BRAIN, > > In my various ramblings, I've tried to cut the whole Gordian knot of > what can coherently be said to exist, and within this the whole debate > on materialism, panpsychism, mind-body hard problems, causal closure > of the physical, etc. by a simple expediency which then struck me as > obviously true (how about that?). To re-state: > > 1) Is there some logically prior requirement for anything to be said > to exist? Reflect: 'something existing' necessitates presence not > absence. > 2) What is the relation between presence and "I"' as I discover > myself? Reflect: "I" discover myself to be present. > 3) Conjunction of 1) and 2): There is presence and it is reflexive. > This constitutes what can be said to exist, and discovers it to be > personal (i.e. there is an "I" associated with it). > 4) Is there some logically prior requirement to my 'knowing' anything? > Reflect: this and that must be distinguishable. In terms of the > foregoing, this necessitates reflexive encounter (i.e. > self-differentiation) This necessarily unites the senses of > 'perceive', 'intend' and 'act'. > 5) Conjunction of 1) - 4) "I" discover myself to be present through > reflexive encounter. I've called this 'getting-a-grip-on-Oneself. > This move now collapses being, knowing, perceiving, intending and > acting. > > That's it. But now we have all the prerequisites for not only > mindwork, but also matter-energy work, by this (as it seems to me) > simple recognition of a present and differentiable personal synthesis. > More: this very recognition now seems (to me at least) to be the > logically compelling prerequisite for any meaningful sense of > existence whatsoever. From this simplicity, by differentiation we can > achieve mental and material multiplicity without limit, sans any > crazy-making ontological separation of mind and body. The hard part > is the specifics of the correlation. > > > 2. What keeps it running (and please, save me from the marvel of > physicists > > the call 'energy' - but nobody knows what it is) > > 3. Who tells the process to buzz off, it is done, > > Well, it will appear, disappear, and reappear as the manifestation of > patterns of self-encounter. Fundamentally, these patterns are not to > be distinguished into mind or matter, and this is crucial from the > necessary though limited perspective of causation, because it makes an > indivisible unity of perception, intention, and action central to the > logic of the story. Nonetheless it will be a requirement of local > narratives in the 'traditions' either of physiology or phenomenology > to deploy the appropriate metaphors plausibly and to give intuitively > graspable answers to your the questions. > > > 4. How does the 'product' incorporate into the rest of it? > > (BTW these questions arise in 'functions','reactions',processes as well, > if > > we think beyond Physix Textbook 101). > > Ah, the product is of course yet another aspect of being/knowing. > IOW, we exist as mini-mes within perspectival horizons that limit us > to mindworlds that nonetheless continue seamlessly in relation beyond > those horizons. The mindworld by the arguments presented above > constitutes both our being and our knowledge. There is not (cannot > logically be) any observer and hence (unfortunately for Copenhagen > interpretations) no observation. Reflect on the neonate: no > differentiation of self and other has yet occurred. But through a > sort of inferred video game system of feedback, the "I" polarises to a > complementary subjective pole, forcing the rest of the mindworld to > the objective 'externalised' extreme, wherein characterisations of > 'functions', 'reactions', 'processes' in terms of causality are > distinctively 'active' rather than 'intentional'. Hence you may see > how all reality and all delusion stem from this survival reaction. > > > 5. Is a "thought" a product of the mind-process? if so, where does it > settle > > to become consciously acknowledged for us... (for WHOM???) > > Well, I pursue my line of argument, and from this perspective thought > is a distinguishable modality of our mindworld - IOW a distinguishable > aspect at once of our being and our knowing. And for whom? Well, > I've been badgering Bruno on this very topic more than somewhat, but > again my line is that the 'whom' is the reflexively present global "I" > derived above, limited to mini-mes by perspectival horizons and pushed > to a subjective pole by the inexorable requirements of a > biological/evolutionary narrative. You're entitled to claim on this > basis, as mini-me at any rate, that you are merely the master of all > you survey, but that couldn't be the case if in fact you weren't at > the same time heir to the whole ball of wax. > > David > > > David, > > this question of mine is not within the ongoing discussion-details, just > > 'about' the ideas exposed in them. > > > > "Mind is what brain does" (although I find it a pars pro toto) > > I am questioning "does". Would we restrict it to our ongoing image of > > physiology, meaning: the brain does physical 'energy' consuming > electrical > > changes by (physico/chemical) impact and by physiological changes (such > as > > diffeences in blood-stream performance, chemical syntheses and migration > of > > molecules) - or do we assign activities of some brain-image beyond > today's > > anatomical biology? > > In the first case 'mind' is physical, memory, thought, mentality is as of > > yesterday and we can stop perspective research. Slowly return to faithful > > creationism. > > If we believe in further enrichment of our cognitive inventory, I > question: > > 1. What instigates the 'function' (called mindwork) - ostentibly with > > connection to our 'material-figment' BRAIN, > > 2. What keeps it running (and please, save me from the marvel of > physicists > > the call 'energy' - but nobody knows what it is) > > 3. Who tells the process to buzz off, it is done, and > > 4. How does the 'product' incorporate into the rest of it? > > (BTW these questions arise in 'functions','reactions',processes as well, > if > > we think beyond Physix Textbook 101). > > 5. Is a "thought" a product of the mind-process? if so, where does it > settle > > to become consciously acknowledged for us... (for WHOM???) > > > > I really do not expect from you to give adequate replies to all these > > questions - it would make the grandkids of our grandkits scientifically > > unemployed but you have unusual solutions and ideas and it may be > > interesting to tape your mind... > > > > You mentioned below the 'mind-body' problem. Considering 'body' as part > of > > the figment of the 'physical world' and 'mind' something more than just > > that, I see an old artifax of a problem, how to save obsolescence into > > advancement. > > I am not ready to go into that. > > > > John Mikes > > > > > > > > > > On Mon, Jul 27, 2009 at 7:34 PM, David Nyman <david.ny...@gmail.com> > wrote: > >> > >> 2009/7/27 Brent Meeker <meeke...@dslextreme.com> > >> > >> > That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone > >> > claim that > >> > the mind is the brain. The materialist claim is that the mind is > what > >> > the > >> > brain does, i.e. the mind is a process. That's implicit in COMP, the > >> > idea that > >> > functionally identical units can substituted for parts of your brain > >> > without any > >> > untoward effects. > >> > >> Yes indeed. But what do we mean by a process in materialist ontology? > >> To speak of what the brain 'does' is to refer to actual changes of > >> state of physical elements - at whatever arbitrary level you care to > >> define them - of the material object in question. So now you have two > >> options: either the 'process' is just an added-on description of these > >> material changes of state, and hence redundant or imaginary in any > >> ontological sense, or else you are implicitly claiming a second - > >> non-material - ontological status for the mind-process so invoked. As > >> I said, it would be difficult to imagine two states of being more > >> different than minds and brains (i.e. this is the classic mind-body > >> dilemma). > >> > >> This is the insight in Bruno's requirement of the COMP reversal of > >> physics and mind as described in step 8 of his SANE2004 paper. It's > >> aim is to deal a knockdown blow to any facile intuition of the mind as > >> the computation (i.e. process) of a material brain, and IMO the > >> argument more than merits a direct riposte in that light. > >> Furthermore, in a platonic COMP, the question of the level of > >> substitution required to reproduce your mind is unprovable, and has to > >> be an act of faith in any 'doctor' who claims to know. > >> > >> AFAICS, until these 'under-the-carpet' issues are squarely faced, the > >> customary waving away of the brain-mind relation as a simplistic > >> functional identity remains pure materialist prejudice, and on the > >> basis of the above, flatly erroneous. To say the least, any such > >> relation is moot, absent a radically deeper insight into the mind-body > >> problem. > >> > >> David > >> > >> > > >> > Bruno Marchal wrote: > >> > > > >> > > On 26 Jul 2009, at 16:52, David Nyman wrote: > >> > > > >> > >> Thanks to everyone who responded to my initial sally on dreams and > >> > >> machines. Naturally I have arrogated the right to plagiarise your > >> > >> helpful comments in what follows, which is an aphoristic synthesis > of > >> > >> my understanding of the main points that have emerged thus far. I > >> > >> hope this will be helpful for future discussion. > >> > >> > >> > >> THE APHORISMS > >> > >> > >> > >> We do not see the mind, we see *through* the mind. > >> > >> > >> > >> What we see through the mind - its contents - is mind-stuff: > dreams. > >> > >> > >> > >> Hence dream content - i.e. whatever is capable of being present to > us > >> > >> - can't be our ontology - this would be circular (the eye can't see > >> > >> itself). > >> > >> > >> > >> So the brain (i.e. what the eye can see) can't be the mind; but the > >> > >> intuition remains that mind and brain might be correlated by some > >> > >> inclusive conception that would constitute our ontology: Kant's > great > >> > >> insight stands. > >> > > >> > It's more than an intuition. There's lots of evidence the mind and > >> > brain are > >> > correlated: from getting drunk, concusions, neurosurgery, mrfi,... > >> > > >> > >> > >> > >> It is similarly obvious that 'identity' theories and the like are > >> > >> non-sense: it would indeed be hard to think of two descriptions > less > >> > >> 'identical' than brain-descriptions and mind-descriptions: hence > >> > >> again, any such identification could only be via some singular > >> > >> correlative synthesis. > >> > >> > >> > >> Hence any claim that the mind is literally identical with, or > >> > >> 'inside', the brain can be shown to be false by the simple - if > messy > >> > >> - expedient of a scalpel; or else can be unmasked as implicitly > >> > >> dualistic: i.e. the claim is really that 'inside' and 'outside' are > >> > >> not merely different descriptions, but different ontologies. > >> > > >> > That's a bit of a straw man you're refuting. I've never heard anyone > >> > claim that > >> > the mind is the brain. The materialist claim is that the mind is > what > >> > the > >> > brain does, i.e. the mind is a process. That's implicit in COMP, the > >> > idea that > >> > functionally identical units can substituted for parts of your brain > >> > without any > >> > untoward effects. > >> > > >> > Brent > >> > > >> > > >> > > > >> >> > > > > > > --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com To unsubscribe from this group, send email to everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---