On 10 Aug 2009, at 11:04, 1Z wrote (to Colin Hales):
> I am not sure what you are saying here. Computationalism is
> generally taken to be a claim about the mind, and is quite a
> respectable thesis

I agree

> Bruno's "comp" is something rather different and idiosyncratic

You keep saying this. This is a lie.
"comp" is the usual thesis in cognitive science. Except much weaker in  
the sense that comp, as I defined it, entails all the form of comp in  
the cognitive science literature (minus the *implicit* naturalist  
Naturalist or weak materialist forms of comp are shown epistemological  
contradictory, but this is the theorem, not the theory.

Or I am wrong? Then please comment my last answer to you. Repeating  
falsities does not help anybody, and create confusions. If we  
disagree, let us find on what we disagree. I have explained already  
that there is no implicit assumption of platonism. Just an explicit  
assumption that we can apply classical logic in the realm of numbers.  
If you disagree on the fact that usual comp implies immateriality;  
just say that you don't understand UDA, or that you have an objection  
in UDA, and say which one.



You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups 
"Everything List" group.
To post to this group, send email to everything-list@googlegroups.com
To unsubscribe from this group, send email to 
For more options, visit this group at 

Reply via email to