marc.geddes wrote: > > On Aug 29, 6:41 pm, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: > >> marc.geddes wrote: >> >> >>> On Aug 29, 5:30 am, Brent Meeker <[email protected]> wrote: >>> >>>> marc.geddes wrote: >>>> >> >>> *Before* you can even begin to assign probabilities to anything, you >>> first need to form symbolic representations of the things you are >>> talking about; see Knowledge Representation: >>> >>> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Knowledge_representation >>> >>> This is where categories come in – to represent knowledge you have to >>> group raw sensory data into different categories, this is a >>> prerequisite to any sort of ‘degrees of belief’, which shows that >>> probabilities are not as important as knowledge representation. In >>> fact knowledge representation is actually doing most of the work in >>> science, and Bayesian ‘degrees of belief’ are secondary. >>> >> I have no problem with that. Certainly you form propositions >> (representations of knowledge) before you can worry your degree of >> belief in them. But you started with the assertion that you were going >> to "destroy Bayesian reasoning" and since Bayes=reductionism this was >> going to destroy reductionism. Now, you've settled down to saying that >> forming categories is prior to Bayesian reasoning. People that post >> emails with outlandish assertions simply to stir up responses are called >> "Trolls". >> > > There are many logicians who think that Bayesian inference can serve > as the entire foundation of rationality and is the most powerful form > of reasoning possible (the rationalist ideal).
Cox showed it is a rational ideal for updating one's beliefs based on new evidence. Has anyone shown that analogical reasoning is optimum in any sense? > What I'm 'destroying' > is that claim. And I've done that. But of course Bayes is still very > useful and powerful. > > > > >>> Since Bohm's views are non-reductionist and still perfectly >>> consistent, this casts serious doubt on the entire reductionist world- >>> view on which Bayesian reasoning is based. >>> >> I don't know why the mere existence of some consistent holistic math >> model - which cannot account for observed particle production - should >> count as evidence against a reductionist world view. >> >> > > Because if the reductionist world-view is the correct one, the non- > reductionist world view should have serious inconsistencies, the fact > that there's not yet a conclusive technical rebuttal of Bohm counts as > evidence against reductionism. What's a technical rebuttal if particle production isn't?? Failure to predict what is observed is usually considered a severe defect in physics. Also, note that there is no reason that there couldn't be both holistic and reductionist accounts of the same thing. Brent --~--~---------~--~----~------------~-------~--~----~ You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. To post to this group, send email to [email protected] To unsubscribe from this group, send email to [email protected] For more options, visit this group at http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en -~----------~----~----~----~------~----~------~--~---
