On 14 Sep 2009, at 19:46, Flammarion wrote:

> On 13 Sep, 09:02, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>> On 12 Sep 2009, at 16:42, Flammarion wrote:
>>> On 11 Sep, 19:34, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:
>>>> On 11 Sep 2009, at 17:45, Flammarion wrote:
>>>> Once you say "yes" to the doctor, there is a clear sense in which
>>>> "you" (that is your third person relative computational state, the
>>>> one
>>>> the doctor digitalizes) exist in arithmetic, or exist  
>>>> arithmetically,
>>>> and this in infinite exemplars, relatively to an infinity of
>>>> universal
>>>> numbers which executes the computation going through that state,  
>>>> and
>>>> this in the arithmetical sense, which implied a subtle mathematical
>>>> redundancy.
>>> Not at all.
>> It follows from saying "yes" to a material re-incarnation. I have no
>> clue why you say so.
> No consequences about an immaterial re-incarnation
> follow from saying yes to a mteriali re-incarnation

The epistemological consequence that physicalism is false follows from  

>>> I would only say yes to a material re-incarnation.
>> yes that is comp.
> That is CTM

Comp, is after some afterthought a more precise and more weak version  
of CTM.
Comp is Arithmetical Realism, which in the present context should be  
distinguished from Platonism, which I use for "platonist theology".
+ it exists a level of description such that ....
I refer you to the paper.

>>> I
>>> don't believe in infinities of really existing immateial numbers.
>> You don't have to.
> No I don't.. I don't have to to beleive in CTM.
> And without Platonism, I cannot exist in an immaterial
> machine because there aren't any.

This is not an argument. I cold as well say: I cannot be a primitively- 
material thing, because that does not exist, beyond the imagination of  
materialist philosopher.

Peter, are you able to doubt about the existence of primary matter?

>> *That* is the MGA point. Unless you make
>> consciousness and matter into actual infinite, but then you can no
>> more say yes to a *digital* surgeon.
> Without Platonism, I cannot exist in an immaterial
> machine because there aren't any.

I assume arithmetical realism. It is part of the theory. I would  
appreciate you tell us in which theory you are reasoning.

> Formalism
> refutes your conclusion without bringing in infinities.

Firstly:  Formalism is not assumed.
Secondly: Formalism in math assumes usually arithmetical realism. This  
is due to the fact that formalism use iterated application of formal  

>>>> Then the MGA enforces that all universal machine first person  
>>>> future
>>>> experience is statistically dependent of a sum on all those
>>>> computations.
>>> They don't exist/
>> They don't exist physically. They do exist mathematically. It is all
>> what is used.
> You mean they exist Platonically. For formlalists,
> such "existence" is a mere metaphor and has
> no metaphyscial consequences.

Formalism is not assumed. You don( follow the reasoning. You are  
working in another theory. You don't address the point.

>>>> If formalism is true, there is no matter, either.
>>> No,that does not follow.
>> You believe in formalism for math, but not for physics. OK. Fair  
>> enough.
>> I was using "formalism" in metaphysics or theology.
>>> The existence of anyhting immaterial is a metaphysical notion
>> I don't see why.
> For the same reason that the existence of anyhting material is a
> metaphysical notion

I try to avoid philosophical or metaphysical issue. I like that very  
much, but just as a hobby.

>> I believe that the truth of a proposition like "It
>> exist prime numbers" is a matter of mathematics, not of metaphysics.
> So do I. I also believe that the *meaining* of exists
> is a philosophical question (as in the papers I qutoed)
> and that your arguemnt does not go throuigh without
> takign a stance on that philosophical quesiton.

My thesis is not a work in philosophy. It is a interdisciplinary work  
at the cross of computer science, cognitive science and physics, and  
theology (in the original greek sense). It is a technical theoretical  
point. You should read it, because I have the impression you follow  
some rumors.

>> You seem to believe we have to do those reification, but the MGA  
>> point
>> is that we don't need to do that, at least once we accept the idea
>> that "I" am not "my material" body, as we do when saying yes to a
>> doctor, even for a "material" re-incarnation, given that anything
>> material is substituted by different "tokens".
> There is no valid implication from "I am not
> dependent on any particular matter" to
> "I am independent of all matter".

Assuming comp, there is. It is the MGA point.

>> You still dodge the
>> critics of any part of the argument, by using philosophically remark
>> which you don't show the relevance *at the place of the reasoning*.
>> Science does not work like that.
> You are not doing science, you are doing philosohpy.

This remark witnesses your misunderstanding.

>>> How can I avoid "real" in a discussion of "real"?
>> By adding "in the math sense" or "in the physical sense', etc.
>> But you define "real" by primitively material.
> That is false. I assert that I am real in some non-metaphorical
> sense.

1-I or 3-I ?

> I can then conclude that I am not being generated
> by a non-existent UD.

non-existent or non-physical?

> That reasoning does notr require
> the assumption that real=material. Even if I am an disemobodied
> spirirt, I am still nto being generated by a non-existent UD

3-I is generated by the physical material UD. That was the point here.

>>> You can't validly infer the actual non-existence of matter
>>> from beliefs about numbers.
>> I have never done that. I show that we cannot epistemologically use a
>> notion of matter to explain the first person account of observation.
> Your argument does not fgo
> through on pure espistemologiy, you
> have to be makign metaphysical assumptions
> since your conclusions are metaphyical.

My conclusion are no more metaphysical than Darwin's conclusion that  
life have evolved. My conclusion is that the physical laws appears and  
"evolved" from the relation between numbers, and I show it is  
testable. There is nothing metaphysical there.

>>> At some stage you have
>>> to argue that the "exists" in mathematical statemetns
>>> is metaphysically loaded
>> At which stage, and why?
> you
> have to be makign metaphysical assumptions
> since your conclusions are metaphyical.

See above.

>>> and should be interpreted
>>> literally to mean actual existence.
>> I don't see why. Arithmetical existence is quite enough.
> If it is no real existence at all, as formalism
> claims, it is not enough.

I don't assume formalism. Yet, I provide the AUDA which can be seen as  
the formalist version of UDA.

>> You need to
>> reify matter, but MGA shows that such a move contradict the idea that
>> I can survive through a digital substitution. You will save our time
>> by reading the argument.
> The conclusion of the MGA can esaily be avoided by
> requiring that a compuation is a causally coherent sequence of
> phsycial states.

... in a way making you saying "no" to the doctor. Unless MGA is  
invalid, which remains to be shown.

>>> And that is precisely
>>> because I cannot deny my own actual existence.
>> Yes, but you can deny your material existence, given that nobody has
>> proved that primitive matter exists. This is already in the old dream
>> argument used in both the west and the east by the (objective, non
>> solipsist) idealist. You are begging the question.
> THat is irrelevant. Since I exist, I cannot be generatd
> by a non-existent UD. Therefore the "mathematical"
> existence of the UD has to be taken to be actual existence.

Up to the step seven, the UD is supposed to exist physically, whatever  
that means.

>>> They are not incompatible with CTM. They are incompatible
>>> with comp because comp=CTM+Platonism. I can keep CTM and
>>> materialism by rejecting Platonism
>> AR = classical logic can be appied in arithmetic (Arithmetical  
>> realism)
>> Platonism = "matter emerge from math"
> No that is not what Platonism means

This contradicts one of your posts.

> Platonism has to be assumed, otr you cannot
> casually introduce an existing UD in step 7 as you
> do.

In step seven the UD is concrete, material, etc. You really should  
read the paper before arguing.

>>> Everybody makes common-sense metaphysical commitments,
>>> and that includes much of science. It only becomes problematical
>>> in abstruse areas of physics. In any case, your argument is not-
>>> metaphysically
>>> non-comital, you are committed to the Platonic existence of numbers.
>> Given that I am using "Platonic" in the sense of the theologian, and
>> not in the larger sense of the mathematician, it would be nice to
>> cooperate a little bit on the vocabulary so as not confusing the mind
>> of the reader.
>> I am commited to the use of the excluded middle in arithmetic, that's
>> all.
> That is not enough to derive your
> metaphsycial conclusions.

See above.

>>> The difference between my position and yours is that my commitments
>>> are closer to common sense.
>> That may be true, but I am not even sure about that. All we can say  
>> is
>> that since the closure of Plato Academy, it is a Aristotelian
>> theological tradition in Churches and in some "materialist" academies
>> to mock Plato-like theologies, you may be right. But it is not common
>> sense, it is Aristotelian habit. Cats believed in Mouse, but not that
>> mouse are *primitively* material.
>> I believe in matter, you know. But not necessarily in primitive
>> matter. I give you an argument, but you don't read it, so ...
>>> There is not UDA if there is no realy existng UD. There is no
>>> really existing UD if Platonism is false.
>> If you read UDA, you will see that it is using "physical existence"  
>> up
>> to the seventh step, and then the 8th step decharge that assumption.
>> Clearly your problem is with the MGA.
>>>> If you are formalist, there
>>>> is a complete formalist reading on what I do, indeed that's AUDA. A
>>>> strict formalist can read UDA as a motivation for AUDA. But I  
>>>> have to
>>>> insist that formalists are in general arithmetical realist ...
>>> Only AR qua bivalence. The whole point of formalism
>>> is the rejection of AR qua existence.
>> This does not make sense. AUDA works very well with a formal notion  
>> of
>> mathematical existence.
> How can I be generated by a UD that exists only
> as a concpet in mathematicians mind?

In your theory, which the UDA shows to be incompatible with saying  
"yes" to the doctor.

> You are confusing
> the dropping of bivalence with the dorppign of Platonism

I will not comment this, because you always change the sense of  
Platonism to assure the local consistency of your point, without  
addressing the points stage by stage of the reasoning. It is  
rhetorical, not argumentative.

>>> However truth
>>> alone does nto get you an existing UD, and therefore
>>> does not get my existence inside it.
>> You existence in the UD* (execution of the UD in arithmetic) *in the
>> third person* sense is pretty obvious, once you say yes for the
>> "material execution".
> No, it doesn't follow at all without
> Platonism

It follows from Arithmetical Realism, like the existence of prime  
number follows from arithmetical realism. You are the one introducing  
metaphysical assumption irrelevant for the technical points.

>> It just means that something exists if "Ex P(... x ...) is provable  
>> in
>> Robinson Arithmetic.
>> I cannot get a metaphysical existence of primitive matter from that.
>> But this is not a problem.
> YOu cannot get any metaphysics out of it, including
> Platonism

Right. But I don't do that.

>> Also, when I say that RA provides the ontology, this is in the frame
>> where I trust the doctor, so I don't dispute the "metaphysical (if  
>> you
>> want)" existence of the first person conscious experience. saying
>> "yes" to a doctor is not part of a proof on a backboard, it is a
>> theological believe in form of material (at first, in step zero) re-
>> incarnation.
>> I am astonished how much you can discuss an argument without  
>> reading it.
> I am astonished you think a UD can introduced without justification

The existence of the UD is a theorem of Robinson Arithmetic. Up to  
step seven, it is implemented in the physical neighborhood. MGA shows  
that this concrete implementations is not relevant, nor even definable  
in any absolute sense, because the physical supervenience would  
entails that a movie of a physical computer would compute, which it  
does not.
To understand this, technically, it is necessary to understand the  
comp-supervenience, and this need a good understanding of the  
mathematical notion of computation/computability, and this is the  
reason I am currently explaining the seventh step with some more  
technical details. We may come back on this if you are interested.

Just tell me, Peter, can you doubt the existence of primary matter?  
Can you conceive arithmeticalism (or mathematicalism) to be a viable  
alternative to physicalism?



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