Bruno,* *
I still wait for the reasoning of the 'primitive'  in your:

*"...if this physical universe can be captured by a program (a number) or
even by a mathematical structure. It is not a primitive structure. It has a
reason linked to a
statistics on computations.-..."*
What primitive(?) structure serves the *computation*? (Statistics is a nono
for me:
the choice of identification (exactly what definition of elements to pick)
and of the domain-boundaries (what to include into our 'picking' territory)
make the 'statistical results' arbitrary). I may have missed your
explanation on that, when the question came up.

And: where do you take the 'mechanism' FROM,  if you consider the numbers *
primitive*?
Does your parenthesis (above) mean that "a number" is a program? I assume
you mean the "very long" number (with their mathematical structure?)
to *express
anything* - being considerable like a program, but do you indeed mean it
that way? Also the mathematical alteration of the numbers bothers me: if
addition, etc. are included, why not express just the final number? - It is
too long anyway, so it is a thought-experiment at best.

Is such an unexpectably long number more understandable than a semanic
meaning?
Granted, it is not easy to 'manipulate' semantic meanings, but with a better
computing (e.g. *fully analogue*) it is imaginable, (*an analogue mechanism*)
- maybe more so than a number-substitute (oops: the other way around: the
analog meaning expression substituting for the (primitive?) number-based
expression).

I asked earlier, but the response did not make me wiser: is there a place
where I could read a (not more than a short paragraph-long) identification
for UD(A) and AUDA? The texts that appeared are too long for my limited
capabilites.

Happy New Year (I will try to be smarter in 2010).

John Mikes



On Wed, Dec 30, 2009 at 10:59 AM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote:

> Hi Mindey,
>
> On 29 Dec 2009, at 15:07, Mindey wrote:
>
>
> > I was just wondering, we are talking so much about universes, but how
> > do we define "universe"? Sorry if that question was answered
> > somewhere, but after a quick search I didn't find it.
>
> What do you mean by "universe"? Do you mean, like many, the physical
> universe (or multiverse), or do you mean the ultimate basic reality
> (the third person everything)?
>
> I think that if we assume mechanism, then it is absolutely undecidable
> if there is anything more than positive integers + addition and
> multiplication. Ontologically, if you want.
>
> All the rest belongs to the epistemology of numbers, or, put it
> differently, of the inside views of arithmetic. The physical universe
> becomes the sharable (first person plural) ignorance of the universal
> numbers. It is an open question if this physical universe can be
> captured by a program (a number) or even by a mathematical structure.
> It is not a primitive structure. It has a reason linked to a
> statistics on computations. Matter is sort of derivative of the
> (machine's) mind. Cf the UDA reasoning, if you have followed.
>
> There is a Skolem like paradox. Arithmetic, from outside, is infinite,
> but it is a relatively small and simple mathematical structure. Yet,
> as seen from inside, it escapes the whole of mathematics, because it
> looks *very* big for inside. So big that such a bigness is not even
> nameable by any of the creatures which live there.
>
> There is a need of some amount of mathematical logic and computer
> science to give sense on all this. Especially for expression like "as
> seen from inside", etc.
>
> Bruno Marchal
> http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/
>
>
>
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