Well, I did not visualize a 'park' of machines. I was stuck with ONE. I am still stuck with the 'selection' in "...the interesting concept is the study of classes of functions which* can be recognized* by a machine." Can it recognize functions outside its inner capabilities? Or in such cases serve the other (unlimited anount of) machines to help out? That would be beyond me. John

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On Wed, Dec 30, 2009 at 1:20 PM, Bruno Marchal <marc...@ulb.ac.be> wrote: > John, > > On 29 Dec 2009, at 20:57, John Mikes wrote: > > > > excuse me if I suggest some circularity in you reply. > > You are welcome. > > > > > > > > A "learning machine" is by def. learning SOMETHING > > Yes. Usually a total computable function, or a mechanically generable > set, or things represented by those things. > > > > > > and that SOMETHING comes from its inside, if we do not specify an > > 'outside' it may explore (which would not be learning, rather > > exploring - a quite different ballgame - maybe followed by 'and > > learning IT'). > > Hmm... I would say yes, and indeed much of learning procedure are > based on exploration of some spaces of possible solutions. > > And the geometry or the math of those spaces can help to accelerate > the search, etc. > > A learning machine is a machine which do the operation inverse of > programming. An learning machine is a machine which receive as input > the input-outputs of another machine, and which regularly output, from > time to time, a sequence of machine M1, M2, M3, ... If that sequence > converge on a machine having the same input/output than the one of the > presented machine, we say that the second machine has learn the first. > Trivially, all total computable function are learnable, (by the > constant "its program"), and the interesting concept is the study of > classes of functions which can be recognized by a machine. > All mechanically generable classes of total computable functions are > quasi-trivially recognized by dovetailers on those classes. There are > no universal learner, unless you weaken the identification of function > criteria (actually allowing an indeterminate finite number of error, > and the right to change the explanation an infinity of times!). See > the paper by Case and Smith. > > > > > The applied (ball)game of 'machine' (substituted for 'learning > > machine', excluded per se from the 'exploring' function) > > > ? > > > > > > reminds me of the puzzle of my midle-school grandkid: which word is > > the ONE spelled always incorrectly in every good dictionary? (My > > wife found it out, immediately, not me). For the lucky guessers I > > allow a Coke on NewYear's Eve at his own expense, of course. > > It depends on 'machine'. Independent? that. too, has to be > > explained. Maybe B&B did. > > > > Your question: "Can a machine find a new thing(?)". > > Can a spider find a new thing? Without judgment, nor metaphysical > identity problem for the spider, I would say obviously "yes". Look at > > http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQABY9H1h1Y > > Some naturalist will explain the spider did not invent anythings. I > think they are confusing levels. If it is obvious that no individual > spider invented the lasso, it is a fact that a lineage did it. > Eventually from deep inside, there is novelty at each instant. > > > > > I refer to Russell's "patentable" which I wanted to address: a > > 'new' ('patentably new'?) thing is not necessarily a (sorry for the > > Ger.) "noch nie dagewesen" - it can be not yet described (but > > knowable - a new combination of elements usually applied for > > different patterns etc.). A good example is in this thread about > > "electricity" as NOT describable to a medieval scientist: it might > > have been "brand new" and unknown, but it still fits into the > > 'knowables', so I think about more 'real' novelty. > > Real novelty? You talk like if the dreamer could never awaken. For a > platonist, there is a sense of saying there is no novelty at all, > indeed there is no time, nor space. Just the natural numbers and their > absolutely incommensurable problem of marrying addition and > multiplication. From inside novelty is unbounded, and unavoidable, as > a consequence of that problem. To live consists in solving the problem > raised by living, and computers are needed to solve the problems > raised by computers. Even in Plato Heaven, universal machine put some > disorder and platonic shit happens. > I guess that's why universal souls can "fall". Among the novelties, > there are good surprises and bad surprises. > > > > E.g. cousins of the Milky Way in outer space before the telescope. > > That did not fit into the Flat Earth views. - A 'better mousetrap' > > IS 'patentable and new'. > > I agree with your ending: " How to define "new", [for example]. It > > is a relative concept." > > To have "perception", even just self-perception, you need already two > universal machines. > > No problem, there exists an infinity of them in elementary arithmetic. > Interacting in all possible ways. > Problem: our experience fluxes are distributed among them all. > Observable and sensible realities escapes the computable, a priori. > > Happy new year, > > Bruno > > > http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/ > > > > -- > > You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups > "Everything List" group. > To post to this group, send email to everything-l...@googlegroups.com. > To unsubscribe from this group, send email to > everything-list+unsubscr...@googlegroups.com<everything-list%2bunsubscr...@googlegroups.com> > . > For more options, visit this group at > http://groups.google.com/group/everything-list?hl=en. > > > -- You received this message because you are subscribed to the Google Groups "Everything List" group. 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