On 11 Mar 2010, at 20:38, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 3/11/2010 10:16 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

On 11 Mar 2010, at 17:57, Brent Meeker wrote:

On 3/11/2010 1:59 AM, Bruno Marchal wrote:

I don't see how we could use Tononi's paper to provide a physical or a computational role to inactive device in the actual supervenience of a an actual computation currently not using that device.

I'm not sure I understand that question. It seems to turn on what is meant by "using that device". Is my brain using a neuron that isn't firing? I'd say yes, it is part of the system and it's not firing is significant.

Two old guys A and B decide to buy each one a car. They bought identical cars, and paid the same price. But B's car has a defect, above 90 mi/h the engine explode. But both A and B will peacefully enjoy driving their car all the rest of their life. They were old, and never go quicker than 60 mi/h until they die. Would you say that A's car was driving but that B's car was only partially driving.

If I'm a multiple-worlder I'd say B's car is driving with a lower probability than A's.

Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal worlds, and he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too. Only in Harry- Potter worlds, where energy push him beyond that limit due to quantum incident accumulation.

What about a brain with clever neurons. For example the neurons N24 anticipates that he will be useless for the next ten minutes, which gives him the time to make a pause cafe and to talk with some glial cells friends. Then after ten minutes he come back and do very well its job. Would that brain be less conscious? He did not miss any messages.

Same answer.

But this can only confirms that you put some magic in the presence of matter. If matter plays that role, by comp it just needs we have to "actively" emulate those inactive piece of matter, which by definition, where not inactive then.

If inactive piece are needed, what about inactive soft subroutine? Then I have to ask the doctor if the program he will put in my brain evaluated in the lazy way, or strictly, or by value. Again, by definition of comp, this is a matter of finding the right level, then any implementation will do, any universal system will do. And the uda consequences follows.

Tp prevent the contagion of the immateriality of the person to its environment, you can only introduce actual infinities in the local working of consciousness. But then you can no more say "yes" to the digitalist surgeon based on the comp assumption. This is like making a current theory more complex to avoid a simpler theory.

Your move looks like the move of a superstitious boss who want all its employees present all days, even when they have nothing to do. Molecular biology shows that in the cells, the proteins which have no functions are quickly destroyed so that its atoms are recycled, and they are "called by need", and reconstituted only when they are useful.

The significance of the neuron (firing or not firing) is computational. If for the precise computation C the neuron n is not used in the interval of time (t1 t2), you may replace it by a functionally equivalent machine for the working in that time interval.
There is no problem

Well, there's not *that* problem.

? The point is that if you accept that non active part can be removed, then the movie graph expains how your immateriality extends to a sheaf of computational histories (that is really true-and-provable number relations) going through you. It is like darwin: it gives a realm (numbers, combinators, ... choose your favorite base) in which we can explain how the laws of physics appeared and evolved: not in a space-time, but in a logical space (that each Löbian number can discover "in its head").

And the G/G* separation extends on the quanta (SGrz1, X1, Z1) giving the qualia (S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*).

I tend to work at a more general, or abstract level, and I think that consciousness needs some amount of self-reflection, two universal machines in front of each other, at least. If Mars Rover can add and multiply it may have the consciousness of Robinson Arithmetic. If Mars Rover believe in enough arithmetical induction rules, it can quickly be trivially Löbian. But its consciousness will develop when he identifies genuinely and privately itself with its unameable first person (Bp & p). Using Bp for public science and opinions. It will build a memorable and unique self-experience.

To be clear, Mars Rover may still be largely behind the fruit fly in matter of consciousness. The fruit fly seems capable to appreciate wine, for example. Mars Rover is still too much an infant, it wants only satisfy its mother company, not yet itself.

But it also doesn't conceive of "itself" and "its mother company" - only it's mission.

Our universal machine are brainwashed at their birth (take this "cum grano salis").

I think the interesting point is that the two may have incommensurable consciousness; they may be "conscious" of different things in different ways.

Most probably. In any case, neither the body of the fruit fly, nor the body of Mars Rover can think, because Bodies don't think. Persons, intellect or souls, can think. Bodies are projection of their mind on their distribution in the universal dovetailing (or the tiny equivalent arithmetical Sigma_1 truth).

If your theory assume a physical primary substance, it is up to you to explain its role in consciousness. But MGA forces that move to invoke actual infinities and non turing emulable aspects of the (generalized) brain.

On the contrary, assuming comp, we get a very simple theory of everything (elementary arithmetic), and a less simple phenomenological account of consciousness and matter, in the way universal numbers reflects themselves. But this follows and used only elementary arithmetic. Like with Everett, the intended truth behind the formalism (sigma_1 arithmetical truth) generates its (many) internal interpretations, in term of machine discourses and what those discourses are about (persons, lifes, death, taxes, etc.).



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