On 12 Mar 2010, at 19:31, Brent Meeker wrote:



Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal worlds, and
he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too.

In some worlds his car is a Toyota.

But he is old. He will not go faster than 60mi/h in the normal worlds.



Tp prevent the contagion of the immateriality of the person to its
environment, you can only introduce actual infinities in the local
working of consciousness.

QM does introduce "infinites" since it assumes real values probabilities.

I said, in the local working of consciousness. Not in the working of matter where comp justifies the appearance of actual infinities. If you use QM in consciousness, you have to use an analog non Turing emulable pice of quantum mechanism for blocking the immateriality contagion.



But then you can no more say "yes" to the
digitalist surgeon based on the comp assumption.

Only if the digitalist surgeon has a magically classical digital brain at his disposal...or if I insist on probability 1 success.

What does that change to the argument?



This is like making a
current theory more complex to avoid a simpler theory.

Your move looks like the move of a superstitious boss who want all its employees present all days, even when they have nothing to do. Molecular
biology shows that in the cells, the proteins which have no functions
are quickly destroyed so that its atoms are recycled, and they are
"called by need", and reconstituted only when they are useful.

I'm just taking seriously the Everett interpretation. Since we don't know what consciousness is,


I think we know ver well what consciousness is. Even more when sick. We cannot define it, but that is different. We cannot define matter either.



we can as well suppose it supervenes on the ray in Hilbert space as on the projection to our classical subspace. I haven't added anything to the ontology.

I don't see any problem with this, unless you are using all the decimal of the real or complex numbers in that ray, but then we are no more working in the digital mechanist theory.




? The point is that if you accept that non active part can be removed, then the movie graph expains how your immateriality extends to a sheaf
of computational histories (that is really true-and-provable number
relations) going through you.
It is like darwin: it gives a realm (numbers, combinators, ... choose
your favorite base) in which we can explain how the laws of physics
appeared and evolved: not in a space-time, but in a logical space (that
each Löbian number can discover "in its head").


I'll be more impressed when we can explain why *this* law rather than *that* law evolved and why there are "laws" (intersubjective agreements) at all.


I don't understand. This is exactly what comp (+ the usual classical definition of belief and knowledge) provides. uda already gives theb general shape, and those "laws" are derivable from all variants of self-reference in the manner of AUDA. (as uda makes obligatory).





And the G/G* separation extends on the quanta (SGrz1, X1, Z1) giving the
qualia (S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*).

And this is unique with comp.


Most probably. In any case, neither the body of the fruit fly, nor the
body of Mars Rover can think, because Bodies don't think. Persons,
intellect or souls, can think. Bodies are projection of their mind on
their distribution in the universal dovetailing (or the tiny equivalent
arithmetical Sigma_1 truth).

I think that means "inferred components of their model of the world" - with which I would agree.

Not their. *We* are ding the reasoning. If it was "their", butterfly would have problem to find flowers!





If your theory assume a physical primary substance, it is up to you to
explain its role in consciousness.

Its role in consciousness is to realize the processes that are consciousness. Of course that leaves open the question of which processes do that - to which Tononi has give a possible answer.

A comp subtheory. Matter does not play any role in Tononi. He takes it perhaps granted because he is not aware it cannot exist with comp, but, fortunately for him, he does not use it at all. Except in his three concluding line on Mary, where he does a mistake already well treated by Hofstadter and Dennett (and my own publications).
Tononi does not aboard the comp mind body problem at all.




But MGA forces that move to invoke
actual infinities and non turing emulable aspects of the (generalized)
brain.

It forces me to invoke a non-turing emulable world; but I think any finite part can still be turing-emulable to a given fidelity < 1.

? Comp implies the worlds are not Turing emulable. Even a nanocube of vaccuum is not Turing emulable (with comp, but with QM too). I don't see your point.



But I'm not here to be an advocate for primary matter (Peter Jones does that well enough). I neither accept nor reject these theories. I just consider them as best I can.

Fair enough.





On the contrary, assuming comp, we get a very simple theory of
everything (elementary arithmetic), and a less simple phenomenological
account of consciousness and matter, in the way universal numbers
reflects themselves.

Simple to you maybe. :-) Seems very difficult (for me) to get any specific answers out of it.

If you study (I mean really study, doing the exercises and research) the book by Boolos 93, you may find more easy to derive the quantum logic and proba from addition and multiplication, than to compute the mass of a photon in string theory. To prove the existence of photon in comp, will probably follow from work à-la Garrett Lisi. I doubt theology could play a role there, except by imposing the initial symmetry conditions (by p-> BDp). Theology explains furthermore why qualia extends to quanta. When I say simple, I mean just "very few bits". Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz). That's all! Well, with the numbers you have to add an axiomatization of predicate calculus. All those things are subtheories of QM. Comp makes those theories false or highly redundant.

Bruno
http://iridia.ulb.ac.be/~marchal/



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