On 12 Mar 2010, at 19:31, Brent Meeker wrote:
Why? The QM many worlds entails that he is old in the normal
he will keep going less than 60mi/h there too.
In some worlds his car is a Toyota.
But he is old. He will not go faster than 60mi/h in the normal worlds.
Tp prevent the contagion of the immateriality of the person to its
environment, you can only introduce actual infinities in the local
working of consciousness.
QM does introduce "infinites" since it assumes real values
I said, in the local working of consciousness. Not in the working of
matter where comp justifies the appearance of actual infinities. If
you use QM in consciousness, you have to use an analog non Turing
emulable pice of quantum mechanism for blocking the immateriality
But then you can no more say "yes" to the
digitalist surgeon based on the comp assumption.
Only if the digitalist surgeon has a magically classical digital
brain at his disposal...or if I insist on probability 1 success.
What does that change to the argument?
This is like making a
current theory more complex to avoid a simpler theory.
Your move looks like the move of a superstitious boss who want all
employees present all days, even when they have nothing to do.
biology shows that in the cells, the proteins which have no functions
are quickly destroyed so that its atoms are recycled, and they are
"called by need", and reconstituted only when they are useful.
I'm just taking seriously the Everett interpretation. Since we
don't know what consciousness is,
I think we know ver well what consciousness is. Even more when sick.
We cannot define it, but that is different. We cannot define matter
we can as well suppose it supervenes on the ray in Hilbert space as
on the projection to our classical subspace. I haven't added
anything to the ontology.
I don't see any problem with this, unless you are using all the
decimal of the real or complex numbers in that ray, but then we are no
more working in the digital mechanist theory.
? The point is that if you accept that non active part can be
then the movie graph expains how your immateriality extends to a
of computational histories (that is really true-and-provable number
relations) going through you.
It is like darwin: it gives a realm (numbers, combinators, ... choose
your favorite base) in which we can explain how the laws of physics
appeared and evolved: not in a space-time, but in a logical space
each Löbian number can discover "in its head").
I'll be more impressed when we can explain why *this* law rather
than *that* law evolved and why there are "laws" (intersubjective
agreements) at all.
I don't understand. This is exactly what comp (+ the usual classical
definition of belief and knowledge) provides.
uda already gives theb general shape, and those "laws" are derivable
from all variants of self-reference in the manner of AUDA. (as uda
And the G/G* separation extends on the quanta (SGrz1, X1, Z1)
qualia (S4Grz1, X1*, Z1*).
And this is unique with comp.
Most probably. In any case, neither the body of the fruit fly, nor
body of Mars Rover can think, because Bodies don't think. Persons,
intellect or souls, can think. Bodies are projection of their mind on
their distribution in the universal dovetailing (or the tiny
arithmetical Sigma_1 truth).
I think that means "inferred components of their model of the world"
- with which I would agree.
Not their. *We* are ding the reasoning. If it was "their", butterfly
would have problem to find flowers!
If your theory assume a physical primary substance, it is up to you
explain its role in consciousness.
Its role in consciousness is to realize the processes that are
consciousness. Of course that leaves open the question of which
processes do that - to which Tononi has give a possible answer.
A comp subtheory. Matter does not play any role in Tononi. He takes it
perhaps granted because he is not aware it cannot exist with comp,
but, fortunately for him, he does not use it at all. Except in his
three concluding line on Mary, where he does a mistake already well
treated by Hofstadter and Dennett (and my own publications).
Tononi does not aboard the comp mind body problem at all.
But MGA forces that move to invoke
actual infinities and non turing emulable aspects of the
It forces me to invoke a non-turing emulable world; but I think any
finite part can still be turing-emulable to a given fidelity < 1.
? Comp implies the worlds are not Turing emulable. Even a nanocube of
vaccuum is not Turing emulable (with comp, but with QM too). I don't
see your point.
But I'm not here to be an advocate for primary matter (Peter Jones
does that well enough). I neither accept nor reject these
theories. I just consider them as best I can.
On the contrary, assuming comp, we get a very simple theory of
everything (elementary arithmetic), and a less simple
account of consciousness and matter, in the way universal numbers
Simple to you maybe. :-) Seems very difficult (for me) to get any
specific answers out of it.
If you study (I mean really study, doing the exercises and research)
the book by Boolos 93, you may find more easy to derive the quantum
logic and proba from addition and multiplication, than to compute the
mass of a photon in string theory.
To prove the existence of photon in comp, will probably follow from
work à-la Garrett Lisi. I doubt theology could play a role there,
except by imposing the initial symmetry conditions (by p-> BDp).
Theology explains furthermore why qualia extends to quanta. When I say
simple, I mean just "very few bits". Kxy = x Sxyz = xz(yz). That's
all! Well, with the numbers you have to add an axiomatization of
All those things are subtheories of QM. Comp makes those theories
false or highly redundant.
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